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Today, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is considered by many as the most credible and cost-
effective method of combatting global warming and meeting the climate change targets. Despite 
this, CCS remains a novel technology within the Norwegian iron and steel sector. Thus, the aim 
of this thesis is to analyse the macroenvironment surrounding CCS for this sector. This is done to 
understand how well the Norwegian iron and steel sector is suited for CCS implementation, and 
to what extent government policies are necessary in order to accelerate development and 
deployment of the technology. The research questions are answered using a combination of the 
PESTEL framework and environmental economic policies.  
 
PESTEL allows for the identification of opportunities and barriers in the market. The results from 
this analysis reveal that the Norwegian Government shows a high degree of commitment to CCS 
through specific projects and funding. However, as the cost of CCS exceeds the cost of carbon set 
by the EU ETS, CCS is not currently an economically viable abatement technology for the iron 
and steel case facilities. For this reason, government policies are necessary to boost development 
and deployment during a ramp up stage, until the cost of CCS falls or the price of carbon rises.  
 
While it is clear that government involvement is required, which policies are most effective is less 
obvious. Yet, based on the PESTEL findings, it appears that policy attention should be directed 
towards decentralised and incentive-based policies instead of command-and-control policies. 
Furthermore, policies should not be implemented in isolation. Instead, a combination of policies 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2018) has recognised carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) to be a technological necessity in keeping down global temperatures. Climate 
change is one of the most pressing issues the world is currently faced with. Greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from human activity have led to global warming of approximately 1°C above pre-
industrial levels (IPCC, 2018). On this trajectory, global temperatures are predicted to increase at 
a rate which will result in a 1.5°C increase between 2030 and 2052. This could cause irreversible 
damage to the world as it is known today (IPCC, 2018). To prevent global warming of above 
1.5°C, GHG emissions must be reduced by 40-50% on a global scale by 2030, and must be net 
zero by 2050 (Prosess21, 2021). 
 
The Norwegian Government is currently dedicating vast amounts of resources towards reaching 
international climate targets, such as the Paris Agreement, and CCS has become a central point of 
interest. Likewise, the Norwegian process industry is taking note of the measures that need to be 
implemented in order to stay relevant in a low-carbon society. This has resulted in increased 
interest in CCS solutions through debates, research and investments (Prosess21, 2021). Although 
CCS has been utilised for several decades, there are still challenges connected to the feasibility 
and scalability of CCS. This is mainly a consequence of technical, commercial and economic 
challenges (Bui, et al., 2018), which need to be resolved for CCS to be fully successful. These 
challenges are a central part of this thesis. To explore the phenomenon of CCS and the issues 
related to its development in a case-specific study, two research questions will be answered. The 
first research question is: 
 
To what extent does the economic and political environment support the implementation of CCS 
in the Norwegian iron and steel sector? 
This research question allows for a broad analysis of the Norwegian CCS macroenvironment 
through the identification of barriers and opportunities in the iron and steel sector. These findings 
will then be used as a foundation to answer the second research question: 
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To what extent are government policies necessary in order to accelerate the development and 
deployment of CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel sector?  
 
Findings from the analysis will be supplemented by theory to develop policies that aim to 
accelerate CCS development and deployment, as a measure to meet the required goals to prevent 
global warming of more than 1.5°C.  
 
1.1. MOTIVATION FOR TOPIC 
 
In a press release on September 21st 2020, the Norwegian Government proclaimed its commitment 
towards CCS research and deployment, through a project named Longship. The Government will 
assist the development of full-scale infrastructure required for CCS; capture technology, transport 
methods and storage facilities. The goal is to provide cost-effective solutions for full-scale CCS in 
Norway, with the assumption of technological dissemination onto international markets 
(Government, 2020). This project focuses on capture of CO2 from two facilities only: Fortum 
Oslo’s waste management plant and Norcem’s cement plant. As such, the preliminary studies 
conducted for this project have largely been on cement and waste management. This has produced 
a gap in research towards other CO2-emitting industries in Norway, who may also benefit from the 
Longship project in terms of technological advancements or transport and storage.  
 
All industries need to reduce CO2 emissions to reach climate goals (Størset, Tangen, Wolfgang, & 
Sand, 2018; Prosess21, 2021). It is therefore important to study sectors beyond cement and waste 
management in order to conclude whether deployment of CCS is feasible, and how policies must 
be developed to support CCS deployment. This study’s aim is therefore to provide empirical 
evidence for the Norwegian iron and steel sector in order to evaluate CCS implementation through 
broad data collection and analysis. This is important for the iron and steel industry as it provides 
an analysis of different macroeconomic factors that can impact future investment decisions in CCS 
abatement technology. Likewise, it may provide guidance for policymakers on how to formulate 
future policies regarding CCS.  
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1.2. CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Due to time and resource constraints, as well as achieving an appropriate balance between depth 
and breadth, the authors chose to limit the scope of the thesis. The analysis and discussion will 
focus on CCS within the iron and steel sector in the Norwegian process industry to enable more 
case-specific and applicable analysis and conclusions. This entails focusing exclusively on CCS 
as a viable solution for the iron and steel sector to comply with environmental goals. Additionally, 
this study focuses on emission sites in the iron and steel sector that exceed emissions of 100,000 
tonnes of CO2 per annum, in order to provide insight into the largest emitters within this sector.   
  
This study assumes Norwegian iron and steel to be an important and relevant sector to analyse in 
connection with CCS related abetment technology. The justification for this is that although the 
Norwegian iron and steel sector is small compared to international players, it remains an essential 
market by which demand is predicted to increase (Norsk Industri, 2016). Likewise, all industry 
sectors will need to reduce emissions, independent of size, to meet climate change mitigation 
targets.  
 
1.3. THESIS STRUCTURE  
 
Thus far, the thesis has introduced the research questions and motivation for this topic. Chapter 2 
proceeds by presenting relevant background information and literature review. This is followed by 
an overview of the theoretical frameworks selected for this study in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 elaborates 
on the utilised methodology. A macroeconomic analysis of CCS in Norwegian iron and steel is 
then conducted in Chapter 5, where opportunities and barriers linked to CCS are uncovered. Based 
on Chapter 5, Chapter 6 analyses to what extent government policies can encourage the acceleration 
of CCS in Norwegian iron and steel. With this, Chapter 7 discusses these results and provides a 
detailed evaluation of possible policies. Chapter 8 concludes by emphasising the main findings 
from this study. Finally, Chapter 9 considers limitations to this study and areas for further research. 
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2. Background and Literature Review 
This chapter presents insight into the Norwegian process industry and introduces the focus area of 
iron and steel as an appropriate industry case study. This provides the reader with a foundation for 
understanding the challenges iron and steel is facing in order to conform to low-carbon production. 
Furthermore, relevant research and literature is provided on CCS, and policies which are of 
relevance for the analysis in Chapter 5.  
 
2.1. NORWEGIAN PROCESS INDUSTRY 
 
Globally, the process industry accounts for approximately 32% of total emissions (Prosess21, 
2021). In Norway, the process industry is responsible for approximately 23% (11.5 million tonnes) 
of the total 50 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent1 emitted (Prosess21, 2021). Relative to other 
nations, Norwegian industry has a comparative advantage in terms of having a small carbon 
footprint, as 98% of all electricity is generated by renewable energy sources (Government.no, 
2016). Hydropower is the main contributor to this, and is also the primary source of energy in 
Norwegian process industry (Norsk Industri, 2016). Consequently, the process industry uses clean 
power in its energy-intensive production processes. It is the process-related emissions that arise 
from the manufacturing itself that contribute to a substantial share of the industry’s CO2 emissions 
(Normann, Skagestad, Bierman, Wolf, & Mathisen, 2019). Such process-emissions are difficult to 
address with simple actions such as improved production efficiency (IEA, 2016; Normann, 
Skagestad, Bierman, Wolf, & Mathisen, 2019). For this reason, technology such as CCS is required 
to maintain production levels and meet demand, whilst simultaneously upholding the social and 
regulatory requirements related to transitioning into a low-emission society (Norsk Industri, 2016). 
This makes CCS within the Norwegian process industry an interesting and challenging topic.  
 
1 CO2-equivalent is a measure used to compare the emissions from various GHG based on their global warming 
potential (OECD, 2013). 
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The process industry involves several different activities. This thesis follows Statistics Norway’s 
standard for industry grouping (SN 2007) to define what sectors make up the Norwegian process 
industry (Statistics Norway, 2016). The basis for this standard is the EU statistical categorisation 
of economic activity (NACE rev. 2). The main sectors that fall under the NACE code for process 
industries are: pulp and paper, refineries, chemical production including mineral fertilizers, non-
metallic minerals including cement, lime and plaster, non-ferrous metals including aluminium, 
iron, steel and ferroalloys. 
 
There are 29 facilities in Norway with annual emissions of above 100,000 tonnes of CO2 that 
derive from the process industry. These have been identified and each emission site is depicted in 



















Figure 1: Norwegian Process Industry. Source: (Endrava, 2021) 
    Iron and Steel 
  
    Refineries  
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The Norwegian processes industry is dispersed throughout the country. It employs approximately 
25,000 people and has a turnover of NOK 200 billion (Prosess21, 2021). These sectors are of great 
national importance, and largely contribute to Norwegian export revenues, consumption and 
maintained value of hydropower energy, development of competence and the establishment of 
business clusters (Norsk Industri, 2016). All sectors supply material and products that are critical 
for complex, global value chains before reaching the end user (Prosess21, 2021).  
 
Since 1990, the process industry in Norway has reduced its emissions by 41%, while the value 
created by the industry has increased (Prosess21, 2021). This indicates that emission reductions 
investments have been prioritised and overall efficiency has increased. Yet, the industry still lacks 
extensive measures to align with climate goals. For the process industry to remain competitive and 
relevant within a low-emission society, and still continue to increase export revenue over time, the 
production process is dependent on a significantly reduced CO2 footprint (Prosess21, 2021).  
 
CCS is recognised by many researchers and industry experts as today’s most cost-effective method 
of reaching CO2 mitigation goals and reducing global warming (Bui, et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018; 
Global CCS Institute, 2020). It is worth noting that other sources have opposing opinions and argue 
against its effectiveness, which is further discussed in section 5.4.3. Social Acceptance. 
Nevertheless, the majority of research clearly suggests that CCS is the only technology currently 
capable of fully decarbonising the process industry (Norwegian Government, 2017; Global CCS 
Institute, 2018). This justifies the choice of CCS technology as the central CO2 mitigating 
technology for this study. Thus, other technologies will not be commented on.  
 
Despite years of ongoing research, the technology readiness level (TRL)2 for many CCS solutions 
is still novel. There is no universally available CCS technology that is applicable across industries, 
and as such, each industry sector and facility require custom technology to reach its full potential 
 
2 TRL is a universal measurement system for assessing a technology’s maturity level (Tzinis , 2021). 
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of CCS (Anantharaman & Seljeskog, 2011). Due to the scope of site-specific considerations 
associated with CCS, one sector is chosen as an industry case study, explicitly iron and steel. 
 
2.1.1. Process Industry Case Study: Iron and Steel 
 
Global industrial processes are dominated by iron and steel. Iron is at present the most produced 
metal, and is expected to continue to be an important building block in production of roads, 
infrastructure, cars, and more (Andresen & Gade, 2017).  However, iron and steel is a small sector 
in Norway, and has therefore not been at the forefront of previous CCS feasibility studies. 
Nonetheless, as it is the goal of the Norwegian process industry to achieve net zero emissions by 
2050 (Størset, Tangen, Wolfgang, & Sand, 2018), the iron and steel sector will need to need to 
reduce its emissions. If this is not possible to achieve through technologies such as CCS, the 
alternative is for facilities to shut down or change locations. This is a fundamental economic and 
environmental problem as it may lead to factories closing down in societies that depend on that 
industry, or carbon leakage as a result of production being transferred to countries with laxer 
environmental restrictions (Field & Field, 2017). This is not a desired outcome for Norwegian iron 
and steel, and as so it is assumed that Norway intends to continue with its current iron and steel 
production.  
 
2.1.2. Norwegian Iron and Steel Sector 
 
The following section will provide additional information on the case facilities and specific iron 
and steel processes. Throughout this thesis, the Norwegian iron and steel sector is presumed to 
compose of the facilities depicted in Figure 2 and Table 1 below.  






As seen in Table 1 above, each facility in the iron and steel sector had emissions between 140,000 
– 320,000 tCO2 in 2017. If facilities were equipped with carbon capture technology, it is assumed 
that each facility would have a lower bound (LB) capture rate of 35% and an upper bound (UB) 
capture rate of 80% of total released emissions (Endrava, 2021). All the facilities are located close 
Emission Site 














Ferroglobe Mangan Norge AS 137,000 35% 80% 2 900 
ELKEM ASA AVD BJØLVEFOSSEN 174,000 35% 80% 0 189 
Eramet Norway AS, Porsgrunn 185,000 35% 80% 3 606 
Eramet Norway Kvinesdal 228,000 35% 80% 0 410 
TiZir Titanium & Iron AS 261,000 35% 80% 0 209 
Finnfjord 284,000 35% 80% 0 1362 
Elkem Rana AS 298,000 35% 80% 2 900 
ERAMET NORWAY AS, Sauda 320,000 35% 80% 0 279 
Sector 1,887,000 35% 80% - - 
Figure 2: Emission Sites in the Norwegian Iron and Steel Sector. Source: (Endrava, 2021) 
 
Table 1: List of Norwegian Iron and Steel Facilities. Source: (Endrava, 2021) 
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to the coast, and the majority are located in Southern Norway. The sailing distance to CO2 storage 
facilities can be studied using this information, which will be discussed later (see section 5.1.3. 
Suppliers of Transport and Storage). In total, the facilities released 1,887,000 tCO2 in 2017, which 
accounted for 17.39% of total emissions in the process industry3 (see Appendix B, Table B.1). 
This implies that although the number of facilities is small, the contribution of industrial emissions 
is significant.  
 
As previously stated, CO2 emissions released from production are primarily due to the 
manufacturing process (Wiley, Ho, & Bustamante, 2011; Bui, et al., 2018), as well as indirectly 
through the use of electricity (Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010). The processes involved in iron and 
steel production are further explained below. 
 
Iron and Steelmaking Process 
 
There are two main methods used to produce steel. These are based on either air-blown blast 
furnace or blast oxygen furnace (BF/BOF), or an electric arc furnace (EAF) (Norsk Stål AS, 2020). 
The difference between these methods is that BF/BOF rely on the use of iron ore, limestone and 
coke (a fuel made from coal), while EAF mainly uses electricity and scrap steel or metal (Norsk 
Stål AS, 2020). As Norwegian electricity comes from renewable hydropower, the thesis’ focus is 
directed towards production processes that are more CO2 intense; the blast furnace and blast 
oxygen furnace.  
 
Most of global steel production is made by pig iron (Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij, 
2011) through two main processes. First, pig iron is produced in the blast furnace by smelting iron 
ore with coke and limestone (IIMA, n.d.). The raw materials are added to the top of the blast 
furnace, and react with heated air blown in from the bottom (IIMA, n.d.). Second, the pig iron is 
 
3 “Total emissions in the process industry” refers to the total emissions from large emission sources, defined as 
>100,000 tonnes CO2/year, and not total emissions in the process industry as a whole.  
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converted into crude steel in the blast oxygen furnace (Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij, 
2011).  
 
These two processes are the main sources of CO2 emissions from steel production (Ho, Allinson, 
& Wiley, 2010). The production of pig iron also releases an off-gas known as blast furnace gas 
(BFG), which is a combination of carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO), hydrogen (H2) 
and nitrogen (N2) (IIMA, n.d.). BFG contains about 25% CO2 (see Appendix B, Table B.2), and 
is partly used in other processes around the iron and steelmaking plant. Studies have been 
conducted on how to apply carbon capture technology to remove CO2 from the BFG, which will 
be discussed further in section 5.1.1. Capture Technologies.  
 
2.2. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF CCS  
 
Carbon capture and storage is a complex, integrated process consisting of three distinct 
components: carbon capture, transport and storage (Rochon, et al., 2008). These three components 




Depending on the CO2 concentration and type of facility, there are traditionally three main systems 
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 Pre-Combustion Carbon Capture 
 
 
Pre-combustion captures CO2 prior to combustion. This is achieved through gasification. The 
oxygen necessary for the gasification process is generated in an air separation unit (WorleyParsons 
Services Pty Ltd, 2009), which is then injected into a gasifier to react with fossil fuels. This results 
in the production of a synthesis gas (syngas), which is composed of CO and H2 (Rochon, et al., 
2008). The CO then reacts with added steam in a catalytic reactor, which gives CO2 and more H2 
(IPCC, 2005). Finally, the resulting CO2 can be captured from a relatively pure exhaust stream 
using a physical or chemical absorption process (IPCC, 2005). The CO2 is then dehydrated and 
compressed to supercritical conditions for future transport (WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 
2009). A by-product of this separation process is H2, which can be used for a range of purposes, 
such as power generation in boilers, furnaces, gas turbines, engines and fuel cells (IPCC, 2005). 
 
This approach produces BFG that has a higher CO2 concentration (15 – 50%) than what is 
produced through post-combustion (Office of Fossil Energy, n.d.). This makes it easier and less 
costly to capture. A drawback of this approach is that it can only be applied to power plants and 
limited industrial plants. In addition, is cannot be retrofitted to existing plants, but has to be built 
simultaneously with the facility.  
Figure 3: Pre-Combustion Carbon Capture. Adapted from: (Chen, Vizzaccaro, Spagakos, & Loizou, 2018) 
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Post-Combustion Carbon Capture 
 
 
Post-combustion capture refers to the capture of CO2 from the flue gases produced by the 
combustion of fossil fuels (IPCC, 2005). It therefore involves the capture of CO2 after combustion. 
Fuel is injected into a boiler where combustion takes place. This produces an exhaust gas 
containing mostly CO2, N2, water vapour and oxygen, which is passed into an absorption tank 
(WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009). A chemical sorbent process is then commonly used for 
CO2 separation (IPCC, 2005). This reacts with the CO2 contained in the flue gas (IPCC, 2005). 
The solvent containing CO2 is then passed into another vessel, where conditions are changed in 
such a way that the solvent once again releases the CO2. This separation can either be achieved 
through heating or a pressure decrease (IPCC, 2005). The solvent is reused in the step before 
(IPCC, 2005), while the CO2 is cooled, dried and compressed for transport (Rochon, et al., 2008). 
 
Today, this is the most diffused technology (Rochon, et al., 2008), as the technologies are suitable 
for retrofit application (WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009). However, the CO2 concentration 
from the flue gas streams is lower than with pre-combustion, at around 5 – 15% (Office of Fossil 
Figure 4: Post-Combustion Carbon Capture. Adapted from: (Chen, Vizzaccaro, Spagakos, & Loizou, 2018) 
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Energy, n.d.). Relatively high solvent degradation rates also contribute to large equipment sizes, 
high solvent consumption and significant energy losses (WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009). 
Identifying solvents with higher CO2 absorption capabilities or higher degradation abilities would 
therefore reduce the capital and operating costs associated with this technology (WorleyParsons 
Services Pty Ltd, 2009). 
 




Oxy-fuel combustion burns fossil fuels in a nearly pure oxygen-enriched gas mixture, instead of 
air (IPCC, 2005). The oxygen used is separated from other air components in an air separation 
unit, using techniques such as low temperature (cryogenic) air separation, membranes or chemical 
looping cycles (IPCC, 2005). The oxygen and fuel are then passed into an oxygen combustion 
boiler system, which generates a flue gas consisting of mainly water vapour and a high CO2 
concentration (WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009). The CO2 concentrations produced can 
exceed as much as 80% (Rochon, et al., 2008). Excess heat is also generated which can be used 
for various purposes, including power generation. The temperature in the oxygen combustion 
boiler system is very high, but the H2O and CO2 rich flue gas can be recycled back into the boiler 
to control this (IPCC, 2005). The flue gas is then passed into a condensation unit. The water vapour 
Figure 5: Oxy-fuel Combustion Carbon Capture. Adapted from: (Chen, Vizzaccaro, Spagakos, & Loizou, 2018) 
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is condensed through cooling techniques, allowing the remaining CO2 to be easily captured from 
the exhaust steam (WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009; Norsk Industri, 2016). Once the water 
vapour is condensed, the CO2 enters a capture and compression unit, where the CO2 is collected 
and compressed for further transport to storage.  
 
A benefit is that oxy-fuel combustion systems can be applied to both power plants and industrial 
sites (IPCC, 2005), however, there are no commercial applications as of today. A drawback of this 
approach is that the air separation unit has a very high power consumption, and therefore increases 
the site’s levelized cost of energy (WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009). This makes the process 





Once the carbon has been captured and compressed, it needs to be transported to a suitable storage 
location. The most common options for transport include pipelines, ships, rail and road transport 
(Rochon, et al., 2008). What is most efficient depends on the location of emission sources. 
Pipelines are for instance currently used in the US, while no such infrastructure is available in 
Europe (Rochon, et al., 2008). Norway has some experience with CO2 transport by ship as volumes 
of CO2 are being transported by ship as a part of routine operations in the food industry (Norwegian 




The final stage of the CCS process is storage. This refers to the long-term isolation of CO2 from 
the atmosphere (Rochon, et al., 2008). According to the Global CCS Institute (2020), geological 
storage resources for CO2 appear more than sufficient to meet global requirements under any net-
zero emissions scenario. Any formations that are sufficiently large and deeper than 800 meters, 
with adequate porosity and permeability, are potential storage sites if other impermeable rock 
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formations prevent CO2 from escaping (Global CCS Institute, 2020). CO2 is then injected into 
these deep geological formations using technologies that have been used by the oil and gas industry 
(IPCC, 2005).  
 
According to the Geological Survey of Norway, geological mapping reveals that Norway does not 
have suitable underground geological formations on land (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2020). It is therefore only possible to store CO2 under the seabed on the Norwegian 
continental shelf (NCS) (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). Researchers 
estimate that 16,000 million tonnes CO2 can potentially be stored here (Global CCS Institute, 
2020). Norway thereby has the third largest geographical CO2 storage potential worldwide, after 
the US and Australia with 205,000 and 16,600 million tonnes CO2 storage capacity, respectively 
(Global CCS Institute, 2020). 
 
2.3. CLIMATE POLICIES AND CLIMATE AGREEMENTS  
 
2.3.1. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
  
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the world’s first and largest carbon 
trading market, operating in all EU countries including Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (EEA) 
(European Commission, 2020). The EU ETS covers CO2 emissions from energy-intensive industry 
sectors such as iron and steel (European Commission, 2020).  
  
The EU ETS is essentially a cap-and-trade system for emission allowances (European 
Commission, 2015). The EU sets a cap on the number of emission allowances (permits) in 
circulation, whereby permits may be traded amongst permit holders (European Commission, 
2020). An emission allowance gives the holder permission to emit one tonne of CO2.  
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The number of emission allowances allotted to an individual firm varies. At the end of each year, 
a facility must submit enough allowances to cover its level of emissions, as failure to do so results 
in sanctions and heavy fines (European Commission, 2020). 
 
A finite number of allowances ensures that emissions attain sufficient monetary value. Likewise, 
economic incentives are created when the trading of allowances is endorsed. Through trade, market 
forces result in a flow of allowances away from facilities who abate at lower costs, and towards 
facilities who abate at higher cost. This forms a system where facilities will decide to reduce 
emissions when the cost of abatement is less than the cost of purchasing additional allowances. A 
robust carbon price therefore encourages investments in clean, low-carbon technologies (European 
Commission, 2020).  
  
As of 2021, the EU ETS is currently within the initial stage of Phase 4 (2021 – 2030), which is the 
most aggressive phase since Phase 1 in 2005 (European Commission, 2020). Phase 4 aims to be 
an investment driver for industries by increasing the pace of the annual linear reduction factor4 
from 1.74% to 2.2%. (European Commission, 2020). This results in fewer emission allowances on 
the market, which will likely increase the price of emission allowances. 
 
The effectiveness of the EU ETS has been criticised for failing to meet its goals, especially in 
Phase 1 and 2. This is due to long-term over-allocation of permits and volatile prices (Muuls, 
Colmer, Martin, & Wagner, 2016). To fight this, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) was 
established in 2015 and introduced to the market in 2019, to maintain balance within the EU ETS. 
The aim is to stabilise the carbon price by extracting allowances from the market when there is a 
surplus, and injecting allowances into the market if (1) the allowance surplus drops beyond a 
certain point or (2) the price of allowances increases beyond a certain point for a consecutive 
period of time (European Commission, 2015). 
 
 
4 The annual linear reduction factor is the rate at which the emissions cap is decreased (European Commission, 2015). 
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2.3.2. Paris Agreement  
  
The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change, where the goal is 
to limit global warming to well below 2°C, preferably 1.5°C, compared to pre-industrial levels 
(United Nations, 2015; UNFCCC Secretariat, 2021). As a part of this agreement, member countries 
have to submit mandatory plans for climate action by 2020. These plans are known as nationally 
determined contributions (NDC’s) which are submitted every fifth year to the UNFCCC 
secretariat. These plans will specify the actions each respective country will take to reduce their 
GHG emissions to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement and climate neutrality by the mid-
century (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2021).  
 
Norway’s NDC report, submitted on the 7th of February 2020, updated and enhanced its national 
contributions to reduce emissions by at least 50%, and towards 55%, by 2030 compared to 1990 
levels (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2020). Norway has clear and ambitious climate 
goals, and many Norwegian standards and goals are more aggressive than other nations.  
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2.4. END OF CHAPTER 2 
 
Chapter 2 has presented substantial background information regarding CCS and the iron and steel 
sector. With this, a short summary is included to clearly highlight the main points thus far. 
 




o Thesis focus on emission sites with > 100,000 tCO2/annum. 
o 29 facilities in the process industry. 
o 8 case facilities within the iron and steel sector. 
o Two main sources of CO2 emissions in the iron and steel production 
process: blast furnace and blast oxygen furnace. 
o Facilities installed with carbon capture are assumed to have a LB 
capture rate of 35%, and an UB capture rate of 80%. 
Technical Explanation of 
CCS 
 
o Pre-combustion carbon capture is capture before the combustion 
process. Cannot be retrofitted to existing facilities. 
o Post-combustion carbon capture is capture of flue gas after the 
combustion process. Can be retrofitted to existing facilities. 
o Oxy-fuel combustion carbon capture uses pure oxygen instead of air 
in the combustion process, which increases the CO2 concentration in 
the flue gas. Can be retrofitted to existing facilities. 
o Norway has experience with CO2 transportation by ship. 
o CO2 can be stored under the seabed on the Norwegian continental 
shelf. 
Climate Policies and 
Climate Agreements 
 
o The EU ETS allows facilities to buy and sell emission permits. 
o Facilities need to submit enough permits to cover their level of 
emissions.   
o The Paris Agreement defines 2°C (preferably 1.5°C) as the climate 
change goal. Norway is bound by this agreement and needs to submit 
a NDC outlining climate actions. 
o Norway has ambitious climate goals. 
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3. Theoretical Frameworks 
This chapter will present the theoretical frameworks that will be used to study the research 
questions. First, the PESTEL framework will be reviewed, highlighting its appropriateness for this 
research. Second, theory on pollution control and environmental policies are presented, which will 
be used for studying developments for CCS in the iron and steel industry. 
 
3.1. PESTEL  
  
The PESTEL framework is chosen because it allows for a broad analysis of an industry, through 
studying the macroenvironment by which said industry is surrounded. The six 
macroenvironmental factors comprise of Political, Economic, Social, Technological, 
Environmental and Legal, and include both market and non-market aspects of strategy (Johnson, 
Whittington, Scholes, Angwin, & Regner, 2018).  
 
PESTEL allows for analysis of factors that are indirectly associated with the industry by studying 
outside drivers that may have direct implications on the industry (Johnson et al., 2018). Studying 
a phenomenon through PESTEL can unveil underlying market prospects by determining key 
drivers of change (Johnson et al., 2018). The key drivers of change refer to the opportunities and 
threats that may assist or obstruct the implementation of CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel 
sector. As such, the framework provides a systematic study with a detailed and deep contextual 
understanding of the opportunities and barriers of CCS in Norwegian iron and steel. 
 
As such, the PESTEL analysis will provide a thorough analysis for the first research question: 
 
To what extent does the economic and political environment support the implementation 
of CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel sector? 
 
PESTEL is traditionally applied to strategic analyses for corporations (Johnson et al., 2018). 
However, this framework has been adapted for this research to apply to study the potential of CCS 
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within the Norwegian iron and steel sector. In addition, the order of the PESTEL factors discussed 
in the analysis is changed to TEPSEL. This is done because the authors feel it provides a better 
foundation to review the technology first.  
 
Technological identifies the technology currently available (Johnson et al., 2018). Technological 
drivers of change include current suppliers of carbon capture technology, transport and storage on 
the Norwegian market today.  
 
The Economic factor mainly studies traditional macroeconomic drivers (Johnson et al., 2018). The 
analysis will discuss costs associated with the implementation of CCS using case-specific 
calculations for the iron and steel sector. This section also discusses environmental economics and 
the trade-off that exists between cost of CO2 abatement and the price of CO2.  
 
The Political factor considers the degree to which government intervention is visible in a certain 
market by studying the role of the state (Johnson et al., 2018). This factor will focus on drivers 
such as Norwegian and international policy actions that either support or oppose CCS deployment.  
 
Social factors refer to cultures and demographics (Johnson et al., 2018). This section will 
investigate the end user’s willingness to pay for carbon-free emissions and the social acceptance 
surrounding CCS. Additionally, this section explores how human capital and business ecosystems 
may influence deployment of CCS.    
 
The Environmental factor studies environmental issues (Johnson et al., 2018). It will analyse the 
environmental risks and uncertainty associated with CCS, and the risks that may arise if CCS fails 
to be implemented.  
 
Finally, Legal analyses existing legislative and regulatory frameworks (Johnson et al., 2018). The 
analysis will comprise of legal forces that build, support or limit CCS.  
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It is important to note that although the discussion is divided into separate factors, each factor is 
not independent of the others. For simplicity, the authors of this thesis will treat each factor 
separately, and discuss each driver of change under the PESTEL factor deemed most appropriate. 
The drivers of change included in the analysis do not represent the limit of possible discussion 
points. The results gathered from the PESTEL analysis will provide a solid foundation to discuss 
the second research question. 
 
3.2. POLLUTION CONTROL: A GENERAL MODEL  
 
The study of environmental economics reveals that markets will not necessarily act in the most 
socially efficient way (Field & Field, 2017). This is because market values and social values will 
likely not align with the perspective of environmental economics, thus creating market failures 
and externalities. In terms of attaining efficient levels of environmental quality, government 
intervention is necessary either through direct market interference or minor modifications that will 
create more efficient markets (Field & Field, 2017).  
 
MAC as a Governmental Policy Instrument 
 
Abatement costs are an analytical tool used for evaluating a polluting facility’s ability to reduce 
the quantity of emissions being released into the environment (Field & Field, 2017). The marginal 
cost of abatement (MAC) is the added cost of achieving an additional one-unit decrease in the 
level of emissions. 
 
In order to achieve cost-effective, socially efficient levels of emissions, the MAC curve assumes 
that the lowest possible abatement cost method has been adopted (Field & Field, 2017). The MAC 
curve holds different input assumptions and can be expressed in various ways depending on its 
context. Figure 6 illustrates a simple graphical representation of a MAC curve for polluting 
facilities, i.e., the iron and steel sector.  










Figure 6 is depicted with emissions reductions on the horizonal axis, illustrating that the marginal 
abatement cost increases as emission reductions increase. MAC curves are often used by 
policymakers and researchers to illustrate the technological and economic feasibility of abatement 
options for polluting firms (Ekins, Kesicki, & Smith, 2011). As such, it can be utilised as a policy 
tool for assessing climate mitigation options (Ekins, Kesicki, & Smith, 2011; Field & Field, 2017).  
 
MAC as a Business Tool for Abatement Investments  
 
The theory assumes that the marginal cost of abatement for a given pollutant will decrease with 
time and technological innovation, or nth-of-a-kind technology implementation (Ekins, Kesicki, & 
Smith, 2011; Field & Field, 2017). Figure 7 depicts the perspective for a polluting firm with 
associated abatement costs for a given technology (CCS) and a given quantity (one tonne CO2) of 
emissions reduction over time.  
Figure 6: MAC Curve 














The graph shows that as long as the price of carbon is less than the cost of abatement, profit 
maximising firms will choose to pay for carbon credits rather than reducing emissions. In addition, 
initial abatement investments will be extremely costly before technological innovation reduces 
abatement costs to the degree where new technology is implemented by all polluters. Government 
intervention is therefore needed to boost initial investments, until the cost of abatement equals the 
cost of carbon by natural means. 
 
The MAC curve is a simplified, yet useful model for policymakers and polluters to study pollution 
control (Field & Field, 2017). Limitations and weaknesses associated with the MAC curve should 
be taken into consideration when using the MAC curve for policymaking and should be combined 
with other policy decision-making tools. As such, additional policy instruments are presented 
below.  
 
3.3. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES   
 
This section will present alternative policies specifically intended for combatting pollution. These 
will be used as a foundation in the discussion of the second research question: 
 
Figure 7: MAC Curve Development Over Time 
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To what extent are government policies necessary in order to accelerate the development and 
deployment of CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel sector?  
 
3.3.1.  Decentralised Policies 
 
Decentralised policies refer to policies that give the polluting parties privilege in choosing their 
preferred method of abatement (Field & Field, 2017). Two such policies include liability laws and 
voluntary action.  
 
 Liability Laws 
 
By establishing liability laws, emission sources are made responsible for the damages caused, 
thereby internalising otherwise external effects (Field & Field, 2017). If found liable for 
environmental damage, a compensation payment would need to be paid. Liability laws can also be 
further divided into strict liability and negligence. Strict liability holds emitters liable and requires 
compensation for any and all damages caused by pollution, regardless of circumstances (Field & 
Field, 2017). Negligence is a slightly more lenient alternative, which only holds emitters liable if 
appropriate steps were not taken to prevent environmental damage from happening (Field & Field, 
2017).  
 
 Voluntary Action 
 
Voluntary action refers to pollution-control behaviour that arises without any need of formal or 
legal obligation (Field & Field, 2017). Two social forces that can encourage voluntary action 
include moral suasion and informal community pressure. Moral suasion aims to appeal to people’s 
sense of civic morality, as opposed to using fines and threats (Field & Field, 2017). Informal 
community pressure attempts to influence polluters to reduce their emissions by inflicting indirect 
costs such as loss of reputation, loss of local markets (i.e., through boycotts), or loss of public 
reputation and thereby stock value for publicly owned firms (Field & Field, 2017). Information 
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can be a powerful tool in these circumstances, for example by making emissions data easily and 




Command-and-control strategies ensure desired pollution-control behaviour through specific law-
abiding policies (Field & Field, 2017). These laws are upheld by enforcement authorities such as 
courts or police, as well as through the use of inspections, monitoring, sanctions, fines or other 
penalties. A common form of command-and-control policy is relying on different types of 
environmental standards to mandate changes in polluting behaviour (Field & Field, 2017). Two 
environmental standards used are emission standards and technology standards. 
 
 Emission Standards 
 
Emission standards set a fixed level or quantity of emissions that cannot be exceeded, which 
polluting facilities need to oblige to (Field & Field, 2017). This is typically expressed in terms of 
quantity of emissions per unit of time (e.g., one tonne CO2 per week), total emissions, emissions 
produced per unit of output, emissions produced per unit of input, or the percentage removal of a 
pollutant (Field & Field, 2017). 
 
 Technology Standards 
 
Technology standards forces emission sites to adopt certain technologies, techniques or practices 
(Field & Field, 2017). This may be certain equipment or operating practices that emitters have to 
utilise. 
 
3.3.3. Incentive-Based Policies  
 
Incentive-based policies work in such a way that authorities first set overall objectives and rules, 
while simultaneously ensuring sufficient amount of freedom for normal commercial incentives to 
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lead emitters towards adopting cost-effective pollution-control technologies and procedures (Field 
& Field, 2017). There are three main types of incentive-based policies: emissions charges (taxes), 
subsidies, and market-based systems.  
 
Emission Charges (Taxes) 
 
Emission charges, or emission taxes, is a method used to control emissions by requiring an 
emission site to pay a certain charge for every unit (e.g., per tonne) of released emissions (Field & 
Field, 2017). This harnesses a facility’s desire to minimise costs, and thus gives an economic 
incentive to conserve on the amount of environmental damage produced, by locating the most cost-
effective method of reducing emissions. A polluting facility will aim at progressively reducing 




To produce the same economic incentive effect as taxes, a subsidy can also be utilised. For such a 
scenario, public authorities pay an emitter a certain amount for every unit (e.g., per tonne) of 
emissions reduced beyond a given benchmark (Field & Field, 2017). This creates a compensation 
system for reducing emissions. Environmental subsidies can take several forms including tax 
exemptions for utilising pollution-control equipment, reducing fines for facilities with extensive 
pollution-control plans, public grants to encourage environmental programs, or cost-sharing grants 
to cover a portion of the development and deployment cost (Field & Field, 2017).  
 
Market-Based Trading Systems 
 
Market-based trading systems are designed to work automatically through interactions between 
polluters (Field & Field, 2017). One common form of a market-based trading system is referred to 
as cap-and-trade. Here, a regulatory agency makes a centralised decision about the aggregate 
quantity of emissions deemed acceptable, and thereafter converts these allowances into permits 
that are distributed amongst the polluters (Field & Field, 2017). Decentralised market interactions 





This chapter describes the methodological framework by which this thesis is constructed, to 
answer the research questions. First, the research design is explained, followed by a discussion of 
the elements that align with the choice of research design, as well as a thorough review of reliability 
and validity measures.   
 
4.1. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2019) describe research design as a structure for how the study 
will be conducted, and a plan for answering the research questions. It is meant to guide the 
researchers from the research problem to empirical observation (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2019). The purpose of this research is to conduct a feasibility study of CCS within the Norwegian 
iron and steel sector, through an extensive market analysis. This will act as the foundation for 
developing new policies that will assist in the implementation of CCS within this sector. Currently, 
there is limited research on this specific topic. This study is therefore constructed on a mixed 
methods exploratory case study research design to develop novel insights into the topic.  
 
A mixed methods design combines elements of both quantitative and qualitative research. 
Simultaneously collecting and analysing both methods allow for more diverse viewpoints and 
interpretations (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). The foundation of this thesis is built on the 
ability to use archival data from a variety of different sources. The use of secondary qualitative 
and quantitative data has allowed for thorough and critical analysis of policy and strategy 
statements from governments and industry participants. Likewise with scholar publications, which 
have been studied extensively in order to understand the technological, economic, political, social, 
environmental and legal drivers of CCS. As such, the authors have taken advantage of a concurrent 
triangulation design through collection of quantitative and qualitative data in the research, to 





Exploratory research designs allow for a flexible approach that tolerates modifications to the study 
as the research is being conducted (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). This deemed useful when 
determining the choice of sector for this research, as the research focus was adjusted accordingly.  
 
This study has used the Norwegian iron and steel sector as an industry case subject, to provide a 
deeper analysis of the phenomenon. A case study strategy has the capacity to generate insights 
from extensive and in-depth research of a phenomenon in its real life context, leading to rich, 
empirical descriptions and the development of theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dubois & Gadde, 2002; 
Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2007; Ridder, Hoon, & Baluch, 2014; Yin, 2018). The authors found a 
need for this research as the information openly available today is generally provided for a very 
broad-spectrum, and not case nor sector specific scenarios. The results from the 
macroenvironmental analysis in Chapter 5 can then be used to develop policy recommendations 
more coherent to this sector’s needs. As such, a case study strategy creates more meaningful results 
as it can be specifically applied by facilities within Norwegian iron and steel. Saunders et al. (2019) 
state that combining secondary data with case studies is a good method of improving analyses 
where literature is missing.  
 
4.1.1. Research Philosophy and Research Approach 
 
The authors of this thesis follow a pragmatic research philosophy in the sense where the focus is 
directed towards making a difference for future organisational and political practises. Also, mixed 
methods designs are often associated with pragmatism. This type of research is initiated through 
realisation of a problem and aims to produce practical solutions to enrich future practise (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). Pragmatism usually combines facts and values, subjectivism and 
objectivism, rigorous and accurate information, and various contextualised understandings 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). Saunders et al. (2019) state that pragmatism entails an 
analysis of different theories and ideas in terms of their actions and practical consequences within 




in pragmatic research philosophy, as knowledge and practical effects of ideas need to be exhausted 
for the correct actions to be successfully applied (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019).  
 
A combination of an inductive and abductive research approach is used in this thesis. Induction 
aims at providing an understanding of a phenomenon by analysing the available data. This may 
result in explanations of concepts that were not previously predicted, such as new conceptual 
frameworks or theory (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). As this research aims to analyse data 
to understand the drivers of CCS development in order to suggest appropriate policy, it can be 
argued that an inductive approach is utilised. Also, the thesis moves from data collection to 
exploring possible policies which is coherent with an inductive approach. Combining an abductive 
approach to the research means obtaining data that is sufficiently detailed for exploring the 
phenomenon, to identify and explain themes and patterns regarding CCS development within iron 
and steel. The results are then integrated into an overall conceptual framework, thereby building 
relevant policies for CCS deployment. Although the recommended policies are not tested in real 
life as a part of this thesis, established theory is used to provide evidence for its effectiveness.   
 
4.1.2. Research Objective   
 
This study’s findings have the objective of, firstly, providing a clear and broad understanding of 
the current economic and political situation of CCS, and secondly, apply this knowledge to design 
appropriate policies for further implementation of CCS in iron and steel. This way, the research 
provides a strong foundation for industry participants and policymakers to develop policy that will 
aid the current development and deployment of CCS. 
 
The research is unique in the sense that current research on this topic lacks specific alignment 





4.2. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
 
The research is based on a mixed methods design, mainly comprised of raw and compiled 
secondary qualitative and quantitative data. The secondary data includes surveys, documents and 
other multiple-source data, ranging from industry reports to government publications and 
academic literature from open access databases. The primary data in this study is mainly collected 
though unstructured interviews and meetings. Further detail on this is given in section 4.2.1 Data 
Sources. 
 
To gain a thorough understanding of the complexities affecting industry, policy and CCS, the 
authors dedicated considerable time towards studying relevant reports, scholar articles, and 
industry material. Additionally, informal talks with industry experts were conducted to supplement 
secondary data findings. The following sections explains the data collection process in further 
detail.   
  
4.2.1. Data Sources 
  
Exploratory studies require considerable observation and information gathering to convert findings 
to build solid explanations (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). The case study in this thesis merges data 
from several different sources and combines qualitative and quantitative data. This method is often 
utilised to provide deeper understandings of the dynamics of the case (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2019). By studying numerous data sources, the authors also take advantage of 




The collection of primary data has been conducted though e-mails, unstructured interviews and 




used in exploratory studies, as this allows for a higher degree of participant contribution, which in 
turn can help uncover new perspectives (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019).  
 
The conversations with industry experts were an important part of the preliminary research. It 
involved talks with Norwegian developers and suppliers of CCS solutions, and e-mail 
correspondence with CCS experts from the Global CCS Institute. The Global CCS Institute is the 
world’s leading think tank of CCS, whose main mission is to accelerate the deployment of CCS 
around the world (Global CCS Institute, 2021). This provided a better understanding of the 
problems currently faced by the industry in connection with CCS today, as well as insight into 
additional information sources. It also helped with narrowing the research topic to provide more 
industry specific results.  
 
Correspondence between the eight focal iron and steel facilities was also initiated. This resulted in 
unofficial correspondence with the CFO of Elkem, which provided valuable understandings of the 




Most of the thesis’ analysis is built on secondary data sources. Utilisation of secondary data allows 
for gathering vast amounts of different data types in a short timeframe (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2019). This has been advantageous for this research as it allowed for a broad 
macroenvironmental analysis from a variety of different literary sources, which is evident in the 
PESTEL analysis Chapter 5. For example, studying industry and government reports provided 
information about past, current and future prospects and strategies regarding CCS. Scholar articles 
gave superior insight into the technical and socioeconomic aspects of CCS within the iron and 
steel sector, and highlighted the main challenges that need further attention. Additionally, data 
from research case studies provided essential cost data used for comparison in this thesis, as there 
is a scarcity of Norwegian industry specific scholar articles found during the literature review stage 




Additionally, grey literature has been utilised, which are literature sources produced by all levels 
of industry, corporations, academics and government, but are not controlled by commercial 
publishers (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). For example, through information by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Global CCS Institute, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE). These sources have, 
amongst others, been used as supplementary information on cost data for iron and steel industries. 
This was of great importance as these additional sources were able to show consensus in the 
information and validate certain assumptions that were made.       
 
Moreover, extraordinary access was given to the Endrava Capture Map database, for more detailed 
industry research. Capture Map is a uniquely designed tool for locating large CO2 emission sources 
in Europe (Endrava, 2021). Endrava’s data on industry emissions in Norway originally derives 
from the Norwegian Environment Agency’s databases. Accumulation of data from Endrava’s 
Capture Map and scholar articles on industry and CCS technology costs, enabled the authors to 
calculate sector specific CCS costs for Norwegian iron and steel facilities. 
 
4.3. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This section provides details on how the collected data was used for analysis and how specific 
calculations were made in relation to cost calculations for the iron and steel facilities. 
 
4.3.1. CO2 Cost Calculations for Iron and Steel  
 
In order to provide detailed evaluations of the feasibility of CCS for the iron and steel sector in 
section 5.2.2. CO2 Avoidance Cost, extensive cost analyses were conducted. Calculating a 
representative CO2 avoidance cost for Norwegian iron and steel involved reviewing academic 
literature regarding the cost of CCS applied to the other case studies in the iron and steel sector. 
Cost estimations were collected from multiple sources in order to produce a substantial overview, 




To compare cost estimation data made in different currencies and years, cost conversion and 
escalation was necessary. Costs were first converted into NOK in the respective cost year using 
annualised mean exchange rates gathered from the Central Bank of Norway (Norges Bank, 2021). 
Following this, the NOK costs were escalated from their respective cost years to the year of 
comparison, chosen to be 2021, by applying a cumulative inflation rate (Inflation Tool, 2021). 
 
4.3.2. Research Quality 
 
The quality of the research design is of great importance to research studies as it reduces the chance 
of wrongful conclusions and recommendations (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). The quality 
highly depends on the reliability and validity of a study (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). As 
such, this section elaborates on how the authors have controlled for reliability and validity 




Reliability varies with the degree to which replication of the research provides equal results, if the 
same study was replicated by other researchers (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). The 
literature often distinguishes between internal and external reliability. Internal reliability refers to 
the degree of consistency throughout the research period, and external reliability refers to the 
ability to receive equal results if outside researchers follow the same methods of data collection 
and analysis (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019).  
 
The authors have controlled for internal reliability by conducting the analysis in a research team 
with more than one researcher. This decreases the possibility of researcher error or bias. Likewise, 
the researchers have maximised the degree of consistency through following identical methods of 





Similarly for external reliability, this study is built on a vast number of reliable information 
sources. This ensures that other researchers would, with a high degree of certainty, find the same 
information and thus develop the same conclusions as in this study. What is possible, however, is 
that new discoveries on this research topic may reveal new findings, such as technology and cost 
developments, or a change in political or social views on CCS. Comparably, when using secondary 
data, this has the disadvantage of providing old, or poor-quality data and information, as external 
researchers tend to have little control over this (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). In order to 
alleviate this threat to the extent of our ability, the authors of this thesis confirmed information 
through various, unrelated old and new sources, and industry experts.  
 
Compared to self-collected data, an advantage of using secondary data is that it is often readily 
available for other researchers. This entails that the data and the findings from this study are more 
openly available for public scrutiny (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). Likewise, literature 
from acknowledged journals and government organisations are likely truthful and reliable, as their 
reputation and continued existence depends on it (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). This helps 
enhance the study’s external reliability.  
 
 Validity  
 
Validity refers to the appropriateness of measures used to study the phenomenon in question 
(measurement validity), the precision placed on the analysis of the results (internal validity), and 
the ability to generalise the results (external validity) (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). 
 
In order to adhere to measurement validity, the authors studied a range of technological, economic, 
political, social, environmental and legal drivers for CCS, which would allow for the development 
of appropriate policies when combined with environmental economics theory from 3.2. Pollution 
Control: A General Model. Likewise, when calculating avoidance costs for the iron and steel 
facilities, cost data from several acknowledged scholars from the field was used. The results from 




costs may vary depending on the methods deployed at each facility. This precaution was taken to 
control for measurement validity.   
 
This thesis is heavily dependent on literature sources produced by experts with high level of 
accuracy. In order to attain a high level of appropriate archival data, considerable amount of time 
was dedicated to thoroughly review available reports and literature. This was especially the case 
for archival data made available by industry and CCS experts, as the authors had to understand the 
document’s original research purpose. As described in section 4.2.1. Data Sources, triangulation 
of evidence was utilised as a method of validating the literature. Triangulation is the action of 
using more than one source of data and data collection method throughout the research (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). The aim of this approach is to decrease the possibility of one source 
giving inaccurate information, which highly strengthens the internal validity of this thesis.  
 
External validity is often difficult to control. However, through the use of various research methods 
combined with conventional environmental economics theory, the authors adhere to external 
validity. This is because the policy recommendations are constructed using the macroenvironmental 
drivers found in the PESTEL analysis and are anchored to environmental theory. Thus, following 
the same methodology as presented in this study should provide the same results. Yet, it is 
important to note that drivers studied in this research may differ with time and preference.  
 
By providing a detailed description of this study’s context, research questions, methodology, 
interpretations and conclusions, the authors generate generalisability for the reader. As such, the 
reader can judge the transferability of this research to other settings the reader may be interested 
in researching. This transmits to the external validity of this study. Additionally, utilisation of the 
mixed methods design enhances credibility and generalisability as more complete knowledge is 
produced (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). 
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5. Analysis of PESTEL 
This chapter will present the macroenvironmental analysis of CCS in Norway, with focus on the 
iron and steel sector. The analysis follows the PESTEL framework, as presented in Section 3.1 




Optimal capture technology is highly site-specific. Thus, this section begins by introducing 
existing general technologies that are relevant for the iron and steel sector. Carbon capture (CC) 
suppliers in Norway will then be commented on. Finally, this section covers details for transport 
and storage infrastructure under development for CCS in Norway today. 
 
5.1.1. Capture Technologies 
 
CO2 emissions released at process facilities, such as iron and steel, tend to be dispersed across 
several emission points throughout the production process. This makes fitting CO2 capture 
technology challenging (Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010). Despite having several emission points, 
the main source of CO2 emissions in iron and steel production stem from the two processes 
explained in section 2.1.2. Norwegian Iron and Steel Sector: the blast furnace (BF) and basic 
oxygen furnace (BOF). McKinsey & Company (2009) found that that direct carbon emissions, 
primarily from the BF and BOF, make up 84% of total iron and steel GHG emissions. The BF is 
where most capture technology research has been focused (Leeson, Mac Dowell, Shah, Petit, & 
Fennell, 2017), and will for this reason also be the focus onwards in this thesis.  
 
As previously mentioned, studies have been conducted on how to apply post-combustion capture 
technology to remove CO2 from the blast furnace gas (BFG) before it is reused as an energy source 
around the steel mill (Wiley, Ho, & Bustamante, 2011). Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg and 
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Faaij (2011) are amongst researchers that have assessed CO2 capture technologies at iron and steel 
facilities. Some of these technologies will be presented below.  
 
Blast Furnace: Add-on CO2 Capture  
 
The first technology discussed requires no modification to the BF, but is a form of add-on CO2 
capture. Recall that BFG contains circa 25% CO2. This gas flows through expansion turbines, 
where the add-on technology can either (1) capture the gas directly through chemical or physical 
absorption, or (2) capture the gas after the conversion of CO to CO2 (explained below). Less than 
half of the carbon contained in the gas is captured, as the remaining fraction is in the form of CO. 
 
Blast Furnace: Integrated CO2 Capture 
 
A second capture technology applicable to the iron and steel sector has a higher capture rate, but 
requires modification of the BF. This is process-integrated CO2 capture, based on Top Gas 
Recycling Blast Furnace (TGR-BF) technology (Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij, 
2011). TGR-BF relies on separation of the off-gases, such that useful components can be recycled, 
while the CO2 can be captured (Tsupari, Arasto, Kärki, Sihvonen, & Lilja, 2013). Due to recycling, 
the flue gas concentration is higher than that of a regular BF (~35% CO2), thereby making the 
carbon capture process less energy intensive  (Leeson, Mac Dowell, Shah, Petit, & Fennell, 2017). 
Carbon capture from the flue gas is achieved using solvent chemical absorption  (Kuramochi, 
Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij, 2011; Tsupari, Arasto, Kärki, Sihvonen, & Lilja, 2013). The 
remaining flue gas is then recycled into the base of the BF as a reducing agent (thereby also 
reducing the need for coke) (Leeson, Mac Dowell, Shah, Petit, & Fennell, 2017). 
  
Shift Conversion of CO to CO2 
 
In order to reduce the energy penalty of CO2 capture, a method is to convert the CO present in the 
BFG into CO2 (Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010). This uses pressurisation and water-gas shift reaction 
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(WGS) to concentrate low partial pressure CO2, into a more concentrated stream (Ho, Allinson, & 
Wiley, 2010). In the WGS reaction, steam is reacted with the flue gas under high temperature and 
high pressure. A physical absorbent is then used for CO2 capture (Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010).  
 
In principle, it is possible to retrofit all CO2 capture technologies explained above to existing iron 
and steel facilities (Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij, 2011). However, although different 
capture technologies applicable for iron and steel facilities have existed for some time, they are 
still not commercially in use. This suggests that barriers to wide-scale deployment exist beyond 
the technology itself. In addition, little innovation in the type of technology has been seen over the 
years. The study by Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij was conducted in 2011, but 
continues to be referenced in several more recent works.  
 
5.1.2. Producers of CC Technology 
 
While there are several producers of CC technology in Norway today, these are at various stages 
of development. Each producer offers different technological features and possibilities for 
retrofitting. For example, Compact Carbon Capture is in a demonstration stage, and has technology 
that is unique in its size and scalability (Madsen, 2021). This is a benefit for the case facilities that 
have little space available for CC technology. Aker Carbon Capture, however, state that their 
technology can be applied to emissions from various sources, including process industries (Aker 
Carbon Capture, 2021). This is beneficial, as there is currently no technology made specifically 
for the iron and steel sector. However, since the Norwegian iron and steel sector is small and more 
research has been done in this area abroad, Norway has an opportunity to learn from other more 
experienced countries. 
 
5.1.3. Suppliers of Transport and Storage 
 
The previously mentioned Longship project will provide full-scale CCS infrastructure within 
Norway. The transport and storage components are provided by Northern Lights, which are 
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handled by Equinor, Shell and Total (Gassanova, 2020). CO2 will be transported by ship from the 
capture sites to an intermediate onshore storage terminal located in Øygarden in Western Norway 
(Gassanova, 2020). From Øygarden, CO2 will be transported approximately 100 – 110 km by 
pipeline and injected 2,600 – 3,000 meters underneath the seabed in the North Sea for permanent 
storage (Gassanova, 2020; Northern Lights, n.d.).  
 
 
Although the Northern Lights storage terminal is currently being developed for the Longship 
project, it aims to be the first cross-border and open-source CO2 transport and storage infrastructure 
network (Northern Lights, n.d.). This means that iron and steel facilities participating in carbon 
capture will also be able to utilise this infrastructure. The identified iron and steel emission sites, 
seen in Figure 2 under section 2.1.2. Norwegian Iron and Steel Sector, clearly shows a wide 
dispersion of facilities across the country. Simultaneously, the facilities are located close to the 
coast, which make ships the best mode of transport for the case facilities. Currently, the storage 
terminal is being developed to hold a storage capacity of 1.5 million tonnes of CO2 per year, with 
an eventual capacity increase of 3.5 million tonnes per year, if storage demand increases   
(Northern Lights, n.d.). This infrastructure therefore provides iron and steel with good transport 
and storage opportunities.  
Figure 8: Longship and Northern Lights Project: Full-Scale CCS Infrastructure. Source: (Northern Lights, n.d.) 
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5.1.4. Summary of Technology Analysis 
 
Technological Advancement 
Advantages and disadvantages related to the technical aspects of carbon capture technologies is 
not the focus of this thesis. However, it is made clear from the multiple investigated case studies 
that CC is possible, showing that there are opportunities for CC in iron and steel facilities. Yet, 
slow innovation does act as a threat for further development of the technology. Nevertheless, 
Norwegian iron and steel facilities can adapt knowledge from international case studies, to locate 
technological developments applicable for specific Norwegian processes.  
 
Furthermore, Kuramochi, Ramírez, Turkenburg, & Faaij (2011) find that post-combustion 
technologies can be retrofitted, which is highly relevant for this study’s case facilities. This acts as 
a large opportunity because there are currently no publicly announced plans to build new iron and 
steel plants in Norway, and a retrofitting solution is essential. 
 
Suppliers of Infrastructure and Technology 
Other opportunities derive from the Northern Lights project. This project means that iron and steel 
facilities may have accessible transport and storage infrastructure, which is essential for reducing 
risk and managing disposal of the collected CO2. The costal locations of the case facilities also 
increase the opportunity of being able to utilise the available ship transport.  
 
A large threat is that the technology is clearly very complex. In addition, due to site-specific 
characteristics such as size and space, technology would require customisation in the majority of 
cases.   
 
 





In order to realistically analyse the future potential for CCS, studying economics of CO2 avoidance 
cost is essential (Simbeck & Beecy, 2011). This section studies the economic feasibility of CCS 
in the Norwegian iron and steel sector by first identifying the cost components of CCS, and 
thereafter comparing the iron and steel industry average avoidance cost with the EU ETS price of 
carbon. This will be discussed in light of the environmental economics theory outlined in section 
3.2. Pollution Control: A General Model. 
 
5.2.1. Cost Components of CCS 
 
To determine the cost of abatement, it is helpful to first understand the three main cost components 




The capture component of a CCS system involves both the separation and compression of CO2, 
and is often considered the largest part of the CCS costs (Dadhich, Dooley, Fujii, Hohmeyer, & 
Riahi, 2018). Employing a CO2 capture system requires both additional annual capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) due to the required CCS investment, as well as additional operational expenditures 
(OPEX) due to the extra processes it necessitates (Arasto, 2015). OPEX may include increased 
energy requirements, steam, cooling water, maintenance, labour costs, and other utilities 
(Garðarsdóttir, Normann, Skagestad, & Johnsson, 2018).  
 
It is important to acknowledge that the cost of capture may vary greatly between similar 
applications. This is due to a variety of different factors, such as size, space, age, unit type, 
temperatures, CO2 concentration, and if the technology needs to be retrofitted (Dadhich, Dooley, 
Fujii, Hohmeyer, & Riahi, 2018; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). This is 
supported by a Swedish case study by Garðarsdóttir, Normann, Skagestad, & Johnsson (2018), 
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which investigated the investment costs related to the implementation of nth-of-a-kind CC and CCS 
in two separate emission sources with near-identical gas flows, but different CO2 concentrations. 
The comparison was made between a steel mill with a flue gas CO2 concentration of 30%, and a 
pulp mill with a flue gas CO2 concentration of 13%.  
 
The study found that in absolute terms, the CO2-rich source (steel mill) required larger investments 
in several CAPEX-intensive process components and equipment (Garðarsdóttir, Normann, 
Skagestad, & Johnsson, 2018). However, in specific terms (cost/tCO2 captured), the increased 
volume of CO2 captured resulted in economies of scale. Capturing ~ 800 ktCO2/year from the 
CO2-rich source rather than ~ 400 ktCO2/year from the CO2-lean source gave a 23% reduction in 
the specific CAPEX (Garðarsdóttir, Normann, Skagestad, & Johnsson, 2018). These findings 
reveal that for higher CO2 concentrations, a larger share of the total cost is allocated to OPEX, 
because economies of scale assist in lowering the CAPEX (Garðarsdóttir, Normann, Skagestad, & 
Johnsson, 2018; Madsen, 2021). This implies that a CC investment decision for CO2-rich emission 
sources become highly OPEX driven, while CO2-leaner sources need to consider both CAPEX 
and OPEX (Madsen, 2021).  
 
Although exact figures for the CO2 concentration at the Norwegian iron and steel case facilities 
were inaccessible for this research, background and literature review revealed that average CO2 
concentration for iron and steel facilities in general is 25% (see section 2.1.2. Norwegian Iron and 
Steel Sector). This is slightly less than the steel mill used in the case study above, but it implies 
that the Norwegian iron and steel case facilities do not need to give as much attention to the 
CAPEX portion of the total cost in a potential CCS investment decision. This can make 
implementation more economically reasonable and worthwhile than for other process industry 









The second cost component of CCS is transport. Kjärstad, Skagestad, Eldrup, & Johnsson (2016) 
examine the costs associated with CO2 transport via ship versus offshore pipelines in the Nordics, 
as a function of volume and distance. Onshore pipelines were excluded from the investigation due 
to probable local opposition and demanding terrain. As Nordic emission sites are relatively small 
(100 kt – 1000 ktCO2/year), and because CO2 often has to be transported over long distances (>300 
km) to storage sites, CO2 transport by ship is found to be the most cost-competitive option. This is 
because the cost of travelling by sea is relatively insensitive to distance (Dadhich, Dooley, Fujii, 
Hohmeyer, & Riahi, 2018). As such, ships are also the selected mode of transport in the Northern 
Lights collaboration.  
 
Currently, arrangements have been made to invest in three CO2 ships for transport in the Northern 
Lights project (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). Although no specific 
estimates are publicly available for the cost of transporting one tonne of CO2 one kilometre, it is 
reasonable to assume that the cost will decrease when a ship carries increased CO2 volumes, due 
to economies of scale. To avoid the financial risk of underutilisation, operators will likely search 
for other facilities to form emission clusters where CO2 can be collected. Here, the iron and steel 
case facilities could be attractive candidates, as they are located near the coast. The majority of 
facilities are also located in Southern Norway, along the route between Oslo/Brevik (where the 
ships will collect CO2 in the Northern Lights project) and Øygarden (the location of the 
intermediate onshore storage terminal). If clusters can be formed between nearby iron and steel 
facilities, CO2 could be collected from fewer designated points along this same route. This would 
reduce the cost of transport for all involved parties. This encourages collaboration and incentivises 
the case facilities to become early participants of the cluster. Once transport volumes begin to 
reach capacity, transport prices can be expected to increase. 
 
 





Within this analysis, only ocean storage at the Northern Lights terminal is considered. The cost of 
ocean storage is a function of offshore distance and injection depth (Dadhich, Dooley, Fujii, 
Hohmeyer, & Riahi, 2018). The Norwegian Government have stated that a gradually decreasing 
share (from 95% to 80%) of the operating costs at the Northern Lights storage terminal will be 
covered, for a period of up to 10 years (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). 
Again, no exact estimates are given for the cost of storing one tonne of CO2. Yet, the Government 
support granted for CO2 storage implies that a storage operator has the ability to offer storage to 
polluting facilities at a lower cost. If this storage infrastructure becomes available to additional 
polluting facilities, this could act as a large opportunity for the iron and steel case facilities.  
 
5.2.2.  CO2 Avoidance Cost 
 
Identifying these cost components provides a foundation for estimating the costs of a fully 
integrated CCS system for a polluting facility. However, estimating the overall cost of abatement 
requires more than simply adding the individual cost components together. This is because the 
CO2 captured differs from the atmospheric CO2 avoided during the production process (Dadhich, 
Dooley, Fujii, Hohmeyer, & Riahi, 2018). For cost analyses, it is therefore important to distinguish 






Figure 9: CO2 Captured vs. CO2 Avoided. Adapted from (Dadhich, Dooley, Fujii, Hohmeyer, & Riahi, 2018).  
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To understand the difference between CO2 captured and CO2 avoided, it can be helpful to picture 
a facility with and without CCS. When CCS is implemented, additional energy is required for each 
of the three components. Consequently, CO2 emissions also increase per unit of output (Dadhich, 
Dooley, Fujii, Hohmeyer, & Riahi, 2018). This means that more CO2 will be captured in cases 
with CCS, simply because more CO2 is being emitted in the process. This represents an efficiency 
loss. As the cost of CO2 captured is calculated based on the CO2 captured per unit of output, this 
means that the larger the efficiency loss, the lower the CO2 capture cost (Simbeck & Beecy, 2011).  
 
On the other hand, the cost of CO2 avoided is calculated based on the reduction of CO2 emissions 
to the atmosphere, per unit of output (Simbeck & Beecy, 2011). Here, the larger the efficiency loss 
(i.e., higher CO2 emissions from CCS), the lower the emissions ‘avoided’ during production, and 
the higher the CO2 avoidance cost (Simbeck & Beecy, 2011). Since the CO2 avoidance cost 
penalises efficiency loss in this way, it means that it will always be higher than the CO2 capture 
cost (Leeson, Mac Dowell, Shah, Petit, & Fennell, 2017; Dadhich, Dooley, Fujii, Hohmeyer, & 
Riahi, 2018). In accordance with current environmental policies and the aim of reducing GHG into 
the atmosphere, this thesis is interested in calculating the CO2 avoidance cost as this gives a better 
representation of the true costs. 
 
To calculate a representative CO2 avoidance cost estimate for CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel 
sector, an industry average has been calculated from cost estimates found in existing literature and 
case studies (see section 4.3.1. CO2 Cost Calculations for Iron and Steel for an explanation of the 
method used). Table 2 presents a collected overview of estimated CO2 avoidance costs for CO2 
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Table 2: CO2 Avoidance Cost Estimates from Literature 
Reference Cost year Currency 
CO2 avoidance 
cost  
estimate in cost 
year 
CO2 avoidance 
cost in NOK 
escalated to 2021 
values 
(IPCC, 2005) 1990 USD 35 425.32 
(Huijgen, Comans, & Witkamp, 2007) 2007 EUR 77 823.62 
(Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010) 2008 AUD 74 454.26 
(Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010) 2008 AUD 56 343.77 
(Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010) 2008 AUD 74 454.26 
(Ho, Allinson, & Wiley, 2010) 2008 AUD 39 239.41 
(WorleyParsons Services Pty Ltd, 2009) 2009 USD 52 414.84 
(Global CCS Institute, 2009) 2009 USD 47 374.95 
(Wiley, Ho, & Bustamante, 2011) 2011 AUD 71 – 100 497.29 – 700.41 
(Kuramochi, et al., 2011) 2011 EUR 40 – 65 377.63 – 613.65 
(Kuramochi, et al., 2011) 2011 EUR 30 283.22 
(Kuramochi, et al., 2011) 2011 EUR 30 – 55 283.22 – 519.24 
(Arasto, et al., 2013) 2013 USD 60 – 100 420.87 – 701.45 
(IEA, 2013) 2013 USD 50 350.73 
(IEA, 2013) 2013 USD 75 526.09 
(IEA, 2013) 2013 USD 85 596.24 
(IEAGHG, 2013) 2013 USD 74 519.08 
(IEAGHG, 2013) 2013 USD 81 568.18 
(IEAGHG, 2013) 2013 USD 57 399.83 
(Garðarsdóttir et al., 2018) 2015 EUR 81 831.36 
(Bui, et al., 2018) 2018 USD 65.1 – 119.2 564.09 – 1032.86 
(Bui, et al., 2018) 2018 USD 54 – 88 467.91 – 762.51 
(Johnsson, Normann, & Svensson, 2020) 2020 EUR 80 – 135 871.04 – 1469.87 
(McKinsey & Company, 2009) 2005 (for 2030) EUR 25 200.18 
(McKinsey & Company, 2009) 2005 (for 2030) EUR 27 216.20 
 
 
Table 2 confirms that large differences and uncertainty exist in the potential CO2 avoidance costs 
faced by emission sites even within the same sector. This is because the cost estimates and 
underlying case studies are based on different economic assumptions, and each facility has 
different site-specific conditions and characteristics. This proves that no single estimate is a perfect 
representation of the costs that could arise for the case facilities in this thesis. This justifies the use 
of an industry average as a representative CO2 avoidance cost for the Norwegian iron and steel 
case facilities. 
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Based on the figures presented in Table 2, the industry average is found to be ~ 541 NOK/tCO2 
or 563 NOK/tCO2 without the low 2030 cost projections made by McKinsey in 2005. Given an 
industry average of 563 NOK/tCO2, Tables 3 and 4 show the calculated total avoidance cost for 
each of the case facilities. The calculations are based on facilities’ individual emissions data, and 
the expected lower bound (LB) and upper bound (UB) capture rates presented in Table 1 under 
section 2.1.2. Norwegian Iron and Steel Sector. At the LB, facilities are expected to be able to 
capture only 35% of their total emissions. At the UB, facilities are expected to be able to capture 
85% of their total emissions. The total avoidance costs calculated for each of the LB and UB 
scenarios have been distributed across the different CCS cost components. This is done using Al-








Avoidance Cost LB 
Capture Transport Storage 
Ferroglobe Mangan Norge AS 26,991,365 18,893,955 5,398,273 2,699,136 
ELKEM ASA AVD BJØLVEFOSSEN 34,281,003 23,996,702 6,856,201 3,428,100 
Eramet Norway AS, Porsgrunn 36,448,193 25,513,735 7,289,639 3,644,819 
Eramet Norway Kvinesdal 44,919,935 31,443,955 8,983,987 4,491,994 
TiZir Titanium & Iron AS 51,421,505 35,995,053 10,284,301 5,142,150 
Finnfjord 55,952,902 39,167,031 11,190,580 5,595,290 
Elkem Rana AS 58,711,143 41,097,800 11,742,229 5,871,114 
ERAMET NORWAY AS, Sauda 63,045,523 44,131,866 12,609,105 6,304,552 
Sector 371,771,569 260,240,099 74,354,314 37,177,157 
Emission Site 
Total CO2 
Avoidance Cost UB Capture Transport Storage 
Ferroglobe Mangan Norge AS 61,694,548 43,186,183 12,338,910 6,169,455 
ELKEM ASA AVD BJØLVEFOSSEN 78,356,579 54,849,605 15,671,316 7,835,658 
Eramet Norway AS, Porsgrunn 83,310,156 58,317,109 16,662,031 8,331,016 
Eramet Norway Kvinesdal 102,674,138 71,871,896 20,534,828 10,267,414 
TiZir Titanium & Iron AS 117,534,868 82,274,408 23,506,974 11,753,487 
Finnfjord 127,892,347 89,524,643 25,578,469 12,789,235 
Elkem Rana AS 134,196,899 93,937,829 26,839,380 13,419,690 
ERAMET NORWAY AS, Sauda 144,104,053 100,872,837 28,820,811 14,410,405 
Sector 849,763,587 594,834,511 169,952,717 84,976,359 
Table 3: Distribution of CO2 Avoidance Cost to CCS Components: Lower Bound Capture Rate 
Table 4: Distribution of CO2 Avoidance Cost to CCS Components: Upper Bound Capture Rate 
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Each of the case facilities have very different total CO2 avoidance costs, depending on their levels 
of emissions. Although this is to be expected, the cost calculations from the tables are only meant 
as indicative. The reason for this is that site-specific factors are not considered beyond total 
emissions. For example, the iron and steel facility ‘Finnfjord’ has the furthest sailing distance to 
the Northern Lights storage terminal (see Table 1 under 2.1.2. Norwegian Iron and Steel Sector), 
and would therefore likely need to allot a larger share of the total costs to transport. Since the 
calculations are based on a fixed distribution, this is not captured in the results. Other site-specific 
considerations that could influence the true cost faced by each individual facility in Norway 
include higher labour (and thereby OPEX) costs, different levels of excess heat, fuel and energy 
prices, CO2 concentration in the BFG, or plant design and operation.  
 
5.2.3. Price of Carbon 
 
In the following two sections, the industry average CO2 avoidance cost for one tonne of CO2 will 
be compared with the current and predicted future prices of carbon, to determine whether CCS 
within iron and steel is currently economically feasible.  
 
As explained in section 3.2. Pollution Control: A General Model, if the cost of CCS is above the 
price of carbon, the case facilities will simply continue to emit and pay for carbon credits. This 
means that whether or not the case facilities choose to invest in CCS technology is greatly 
dependent on the current and future prices of carbon set by trading systems such as the EU ETS 
or carbon taxes.  
 
At present time (date: 16th April 2021), the price at which carbon is traded is 44.33 EUR (EMBER, 
2021), which is equivalent to 444 NOK at today’s exchange rate. This is an all-time high, signalling 
that the price of carbon is on the rise. This is supported by the drastic development in the EU 
allowance (EUA) price since 2018, as seen in Figure 10 below. As much as a 471% increase is 
evident since January 1st, 2018. 











If the price continues to rise on this trajectory, this could significantly impact the possibilities for 
CCS within the Norwegian iron and steel sector. 
 
According to analyses done by Atkins & Oslo Economics (2016), the carbon price needs to 
increase to approximately 2000 NOK/tCO2 by 2050 in order to achieve the emissions reductions 
necessary to reach the 2°C target. This reflects the optimal CO2 price, based on the assumption 
that all countries choose the cheapest possible method of abatement per tonne CO2. This also 
implies that even higher prices would be needed to reach the new 1.5°C target. Based on data from 
2016, Atkins & Oslo Economics calculated predictions for future carbon price development. These 
price projections revealed that expected development was far below the optimal level.  
 
Today, the development can be expected to be on a steeper projection than the price paths 
predictions made in 2016. The annual linear reduction factor decreases supply which may continue 
to drive up the price, but the Market Stability Reserve’s implementation in 2019 will also likely 
contribute to stabilising the price through removing excess allowances from the market. 
Nevertheless, to reach the 2000 NOK/tCO2 optimal price by 2050 from today’s price of 444 
NOK/tCO2, yet another 350% increase is needed.  
Figure 10: Price of Carbon in EU ETS. Source: (EMBER, 2021) 
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5.2.4. Socioeconomic Emission Level  
 
The current market price for CO2 emissions is not high enough to reflect the marginal cost of using 
carbon abating technology. Given the current carbon price of 444 NOK/tCO2 and the industry 
average avoidance cost of ~ 563 NOK/tCO2, this means that a facility emitting CO2 would save 
approximately 120 NOK/tCO2 by buying more allowances relative to the cost of capture. This 
difference may be even more drastic in reality, as several of the cost expectations that make up the 
industry average are based on the assumption of nth-of-a-kind CCS facilities (see section 8.1. 
Limitations to this Study). First-of-a-kind facilities, such as Norwegian iron and steel, will likely 
have to bear more costs and risk associated with early development and application (Norwegian 













The gap between the CO2 avoidance cost and price of carbon prevents the industry from achieving 
a socially efficient level of emissions, as illustrated in Figure 11 above. The price of emitting 
carbon is lower than the socioeconomic costs associated with such emissions, which results in a 
negative externality (Zapantis, Townsend, & Rassool, 2019; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy, 2020). It is not before the MAC decreases or the price of carbon increases, that it 
becomes profitable for iron and steel facilities to invest in CCS. This is currently a huge barrier for 
Figure 11: Estimated Development of CO2-price and MAC Curve. Adapted from (Stub, Skriung, Post-Melbye, & Holm, 2019) 
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CCS development in the iron and steel sector, as well as any other polluting sectors where the 
MAC exceeds the CO2-price.  
 
Furthermore, it may become more profitable to be a second-mover in the market. This is because 
the costs of CCS are expected to fall in cases where capacity utilisation increases, solutions in the 
chain are optimised, or technology improves (DNV GL Energy, 2020). As the benefits of CCS are 
shared by many while the costs are borne by few, it can be said that the technology shares 
characteristics to that of a public good and positive externality (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy, 2020). If the market is left to its own devices, too little of this technology will be 
employed, and too little will be abated. With government intervention in the form of monetary aid, 
regulatory support or other incentive schemes, initial investments will be encouraged until the cost 
decreases by means of innovation and efficiency. Therefore, it is imperative for governments to 
be involved in CCS deployment, as depicted in Figure 11. 
 
5.2.5. Summary of Economics Analysis 
 
Cost Components of CCS 
Applying CCS technology increases both the total CAPEX and OPEX. However, due to economies 
of scale, the CAPEX-share of the total costs becomes less significant for the case facilities. If the 
facilities also have operating and maintenance processes in place that can be shared with the new 
CC technology, it can dampen the economic burden of installing CCS in the existing sites. This 
presents an opportunity for lower marginal abatement costs. 
 
Large initial investments are required for transport and storage infrastructure during the ramp up 
phase. Because it is possible that these two components will be underutilised during the first years 
until the number of facilities that participate in CO2 capture increases, a barrier is the decision of 
who should carry the financial risk of underutilisation. However, if the Government provides 
financial aid in this area, it could enable operators to offer cheaper transport and storage until 
utilisation increases. If clusters are formed, the case facilities could be attractive users of the 
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existing infrastructure, as the majority are located along the same Southern route as the Northern 
Lights project plans to sail.  
 
Socioeconomic Emission Level 
There is large uncertainty in the cost estimates related to the implementation of CCS. A reason for 
this is that avoidance costs are highly case-specific. Based on an industry average, it is possible to 
see that this exceeds the current price of carbon, thereby weakening the economic incentive for the 
case facilities to invest in carbon capture. Each facility’s CO2 avoidance cost is the minimal price 
of carbon required to realistically consider CCS. To account for the added capital and risk that 
CCS entails relative to simply purchasing carbon credits, it would presumably need to be even 
higher. This is a significant cost barrier associated with CCS. In addition, although the cost of CCS 
is expected to decrease in the years to come, how quickly learning-by-doing will lower these costs 
is uncertain. This encourages a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, by which facilities prefer to enter the 
market when the costs are lower, and expertise has increased. Therefore, to encourage first-of-a-




Norway’s Government has been heavily involved in CCS since the 1990’s through various 
initiatives. The Government’s interest in CCS initially derived from the oil and gas industry to be 
utilised as a measure for emission reductions and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) (Gassnova, 2020). 
This involvement has evolved into additional environmental strategies and international 
environmental treaties with clear focus on aiding the nation towards a zero-emission society. The 
following section analyses national and international political factors that have influenced CCS 
development within Norway, and its impact on the iron and steel industry.   
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5.3.1. Norwegian Policy Frameworks and Incentives 
 
Norway’s NDC’s and overall climate target is to achieve a reduction of 50% (and towards 55%) 
in emissions by 2030, compared to emission levels in 1990. The Norwegian Climate Strategy for 
2030 (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2017) gives a thorough overview of 
different plans for reaching the 2030 target. With regard to the process industry, roadmaps have 
been developed that focus on the long-term technological developments essential for reducing 
emissions from process production. Discussions between government and the process industry 
have resulted in the constellation of Prosess21. This is to act as a strategic forum for sustainable 
growth and development for the process industry in combination with emission reduction 
strategies.  
 
The Government proposed a white paper in 2017 (approved by the Solberg Government), 
dedicated solely towards process industry. The white paper states that the Government will strive 
for a “greener, smarter and more innovative industry” by which “Norway will be a world leader 
in industry and technology” (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2017). In this white paper, 
the Government states that facilitating green growth in existing industry exposed to international 
competition will be challenging. This is especially the case for iron and steel, as this is a small 
sector compared to international iron and steel. It is therefore essential that small sectors receive 
government aid, if the government is to fulfil its promise of facilitating growth in existing 
Norwegian industry while pushing for strict climate goals and preventing carbon leakage (Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2017).  
 
Researchers at the Global CCS Institute argue that the policies currently in place are insufficiently 
designed to meet emission reduction goals (Zapantis, Townsend, & Rassool, 2019). To support 
their argument, Bui et al. (2018) state that the lack of financial funding and supportive government 
through policy and legislative frameworks are the key reasons for the slow advancement of CCS. 
They argue that there would currently be more CCS projects at a commercial stage if these aspects 
were given more attention. In addition to policies directly related to process industries, the 
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Government is also heavily devoted to its Longship project. It is apparent that Norway’s 
formulation of environmental policy is contributing to the development of this unique full-scale 
CCS project. However, direct financial funding towards the iron and steel industry is still not 
evident. As such, current policy settings regarding the iron and steel sector does not support private 
business investments within CCS (Global CCS Institute, 2020). This may result in slower 
deployment of CCS within this sector. As such, appropriate incentives and legislation are essential 
for private iron and steel investors to take part in separate CCS projects.  
 
5.3.2.  Norwegian Government Research Facilities and CCS Projects 
 
The Norwegian Government has executed targeted work for CCS application through policy 
instruments that have been designed to support the development of CCS projects. The key 
governmental entity responsible for CCS policy and technological development is Gassnova SF, 
established in 2005. Gassnova administers several CCS initiatives on behalf of the Norwegian 
state, including Technology Centre Mongstad (TCM), CLIMIT, and the Longship Project. Norway 
is also involved in Centres for Environment-friendly Energy Research (FME), the European CCS 
Research Infrastructure (ECCSEL), Norwegian CCS Research Centre (NCCS), and more 
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). An example of a successful Norwegian 
Government CCS project is TCM, which has been operational since 2012. TCM is viewed as one 
of the world’s largest test facilities today continuously working on the development, testing and 
qualification for CCS technology (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). With this 
experience, TCM has contributed to reducing both costs and risks associated with full-scale CCS  
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). Likewise, research by CLIMIT has resulted 
in more efficient technology and contributions to the safety and reduced risks associated with CCS, 
whereas ECCSEL and FME have developed international collaborations and research on capture, 
transportation and storage (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). These 
engagements show an obvious commitment by Norwegian Government. 
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Norway’s political involvement in CCS has received support and resistance, and has resulted in 
both successful and abandoned projects. Jens Stoltenberg’s ‘moon landing’ proposal for full-scale 
CCS in 2007 was heavily criticised due to insufficient technology testing plans, as well as high 
risk and costs estimations, resulting in plans being terminated in August 2013 (Gassnova, 2020). 
Yet, the Government pledged to continue their work towards full-scale CCS, though a new and 
improved strategic plan was necessary (Gassnova, 2020).   
 
As stated, the Norwegian Government is investing massive resources towards the development of 
policies and projects involving CCS (Norwegian Government, 2017; Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2020). The most recent, and largest, initiative is the full-scale CCS 
Longship project. Longship has the goal of contributing with information and experience that will 
further result in new jobs, technological development, cost reductions, international collaborations 
and full-scale CCS infrastructure (Solberg, 2020; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2020). For example, Norwegian national regulations have allowed for testing of geographical 
storage sites for CO2, which is now an essential part of Longship. Longship is also projected to act 
as a catalyst for increased international interest in CCS (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2020). The Longship project assumes that other countries will take note of Norway’s 
involvement within CCS, which will lead to increased international CC projects. Norway plans to 
boost such interest through their CO2 storage facility, which holds the capacity to store CO2 from 
international sources. This way, the project may generate income from storing CO2 from European 
sources. These are conditions that the Government deems essential for Longship’s long-term 
success (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020).  
 
It is obvious that the Norwegian Government has interest in increasing private CCS investments, 
in Norway and internationally, in order to strengthen their investments in the Longship project. 
Yet, focus on the iron and steel sector (and other emitting industries) is insignificant compared to 
that of Fortum Oslo waste management plant and Norcem’s cement plant. In the initial stages of 
CCS involvement, it makes economic sense to focus on the most feasible projects. However, this 
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results in a lack of resources and innovation in industries that also need development, such as iron 
and steel, and this can act as a barrier and competitive disadvantage for the industry.  
 




Norway has a long history of ambitious climate policies. The main policy tool used in Norway is 
a carbon tax, introduced in 1991 (Bruvoll & Larsen, 2002). Bruvoll and Larsen (2002) concluded 
that the effect carbon tax had on emission reductions was merely modest. This was due to extensive 
tax exemptions for the process industry and inefficient differentiation of tax rates for specific 
sectors, such as iron and steel. The lack of CO2 taxation within process industries eventually 
resulted in experimentation with a Norwegian CO2 quota system, which fused with the EU ETS 
system in 2008 (Bruvoll & Dalen, 2009). Further analysis of the EU ETS system is given in section 
5.3.5. Emission Trading Schemes. 
 
The Global CCS Institute (2020) argues, however, that the carbon tax has been the main driver of 
CCS development in Norway. The implementation of the carbon tax resulted in a significant value 
of CO2, giving Norwegian industries an economic incentive to avoid CO2 emissions. From an 
international perspective, the Global CCS Institute (2020) claims that the value of CO2 emissions 
is currently insufficient and acts as one of the main barriers towards further development of CCS. 
As such, Norwegian iron and steel has less opportunity to learn from international technological 
advancements. 
 
The Government's current long-term plans involve a threefold increase of the carbon tax by 2030. 
The Government believes that an increase from circa NOK 590 to 2000 of emitting one tonne of 
CO2 equivalents will provide stronger incentives for industries to reduce their emissions. Theory 
provides strong evidence that a tax increase will lead to emissions reductions (Kolstad, 2011; Field 
& Field, 2017). A tax increase may therefore result in synergy effects within CCS for process 
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industries as more market players invest in abatement technology, which can eventually be adapted 
by iron and steel at a lower cost. However, tax increases are usually not welcomed by voters, and 
a large tax increase may negatively impact the iron and steel sector by increasing industry costs as 




The CCS projects and initiatives established by the Norwegian Government have been possible 
through clear political goals and fiscal policy. However, national monetary investments in CO2-
management and CCS have stagnated over time, and the effect of this is evident on the 











Figure 12: Government Investments in CO2 Management and Compensation. Derived from: National Accounts 2014-2020; 
National Budget 2021, sections 1840; 142074. 
 
Figure 12 (see Appendix C for specific budget line explanations) provides a historical overview of 
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government investments towards CO2 management and CO2 compensation for process industry5. 
This data is included in the analysis to provide a clearer understanding of the Government’s 
dedication towards CO2 mitigation, over time. Total funding has fluctuated since 2014, and the 
rise in past couple of years is due to increased funding towards preventing carbon leakage through 
CO2 compensations, rather than increasing government funding towards CO2 management. This 
shows a lack of commitment towards direct CO2 prevention since 2014, however, as of 2021, the 
Longship project will receive substantial monetary funding, as suggested by the 2021 budget.    
 
Realisation of CCS requires excessive amounts of capital. Private investments are most likely to 
occur where direct injection of capital is provided through, for example, direct grant funding (Bui, 
et al., 2018; Global CCS Institute, 2020). Although the Government portrays evidence of interest 
in CCS, funding has been limited to this date. The lack of funding may be due to insufficient plans 
for establishing where monetary resources are most efficiently allocated. Even so, the Government 
and Norwegian Parliament has portrayed interest in CCS in the national budget since 2014, with 
realisation though the current Longship project (Ministry of Finance, 2020).  
 
In the relative short-term, national and international funding is deemed essential for initiating large 
scale CCS investments. However, due to limited government budgets, public spending will not be 
sustainable in the long-term and is dependent on private investments (ZERO, 2013).  
 
5.3.4.  International Government Policy 
 
Norway’s involvement in several international climate legislations gives the Norwegian 
Government the opportunity to formulate international legislation and goals, and encourage 
neighbouring countries’ involvement in CCS. To illustrate this, the Norwegian Government 
recently proposed that the EU increase its efforts, by which the European Commission has 
 
5 “CO2 compensation” is financial compensation distributed to energy-intensive industry sectors, thereby iron and 
steel, that are exposed to carbon leakage. The compensation period is valid from 2013 – 2020 (Lovdata, 2013). 
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responded by suggesting increases in their emission reduction climate targets for 2030 from at 
least 40% to 55% (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). For CCS to become a 
competitive climate policy, international involvement is essential (United Nations, 2015; 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). International cooperation may also create 
synergies that can enhance the Norwegian iron and steel sector’s CCS capabilities.  
 
Norway’s strong global relations and political position within international networks is assumed 
to benefit Norway’s investments in CCS, in the event that international interest and projects for 
CCS spikes (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). This is especially relevant for 
Norway if success in promoting conglomeration within the Longship project is achieved. 
Encouraging foreign participation will result in Norway being able to receive higher returns on 
their investments on CCS projects, critical for its long-term success (Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2020). However, if demand for storage space from foreign participants 
increases significantly over time, this may negatively impact the iron and steel industry’s storage 
possibilities, unless a binding contract with the Norwegian Government is made. 
 
Other systems of tax incentives, such as the 45Q tax credit arrangement in the US, have also 
incentivised CCS initiatives. As an example, the US, who has the highest number of CCS facilities 
in the world, has implemented attractive tax credits (45Q tax) in connection with the opportunity 
to sell captured CO2 to EOR. This has been two of the key drivers for CCS involvement in the US 
(Global CCS Institute, 2020; Pareto Securities, 2020). The effectiveness of the 45Q has been 
heavily debated as the 45Q goes against the goal of reducing overall industrial CO2 production. 
Instead, the 45Q creates a demand for capturing CO2 which consequently increases the demand 
for producing CO2 (Madsen, 2021). As such, there is no incentive for finding solutions and 
developing technology that will result in decreased CO2 production. The Norwegian Government 
and iron and steel sector currently have the opportunity to study international cases in order to 
improve their own efforts towards CCS and locate specific drivers for investments in CCS 
deployment. 
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5.3.5. Emission Trading Schemes  
 
Economists argue that setting a price on emissions is the most cost-effective method of abating 
GHG (Borenstein, 2012). Carbon markets and the EU ETS are examples of this. As explained in 
section 2.3.1. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the EU ETS is essentially an international 
GHG mitigation strategy, aimed at reducing emissions at the lowest possible cost. The European 
Commission will continue with free allocation of emission allowances to support international 
competitiveness and limit carbon leakage. This may prove important for iron and steel during the 
low-carbon transition by providing adequate time for the development and adaptation of new CCS 
technologies. This also reduces the likelihood of iron and steel facilities located in Norway to move 
facilities to other counties with fewer policy restrictions, which is the principal of carbon leakage. 
Lastly, the European Commission aims to aid industries with financial investment challenges for 
emission reductions by initiating low-carbon funding mechanisms (European Commission, 2020). 
This may support the development of CCS within the Norwegian iron and steel industry, where 
Norwegian government funding lacks. This is particularly important from 2021, as the Norwegian 
Government’s CO2 compensation fund period has ended (as depicted in Figure 12).  
 
Historically, the EU ETS has had moderate effect as low economic growth in Europe has resulted 
in high distribution of allowances (Norwegian Government, 2017). This created a surplus of 
emission allowances, resulting in low carbon prices. Due to low allowance prices and inefficient 
allocation of free allowances towards process industries, critics argue that the EU ETS is 
inefficiently reducing GHG and will fail to meet climate targets in the required time (Klemetsen, 
Rosendahl, & Jakobsen, 2016). Onarheim et al. (2015) argued that neither the current EU ETS 
price nor the future predictions of carbon prices was sufficient enough to stimulate the capital-
intensive investments within CCS.  
 
As mentioned in 5.2.3. Price of Carbon, the price of carbon is trading at an all-time high. If carbon 
prices continue to rise, this will create stronger incentives for CO2 mitigation investments, which 
will put pressure on Norwegian iron and steel. However, too high carbon prices may lead to 
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decreased competitiveness for Norwegian iron and steel, when trading on the much larger 
international iron and steel industry. 
 
5.3.6. Political and Regulatory Stability  
 
Other identifiable drivers which may influence CCS within Norwegian iron and steel are variations 
in political and regulatory stability. As the above analysis portrays, the Norwegian Government 
has historically shown dedication towards environmentally cautious policies. Although 
government funding has fluctuated, it is reasonable to assume that political dedication towards 
environmentally friendly policies will continue, as this has historically been the case for all main 
Norwegian political parties the past decades (Lipponen, et al., 2017). Yet, it is difficult to predict 
how future policies may be formulated in the case of a new government constellation, which occurs 
every four years in Norway. Also, new government assessments may suggest that resources 
allocated towards other climate mitigating solutions results in improved cost-benefit analyses. 
Likewise, slow economic growth or recessions may threaten political stability towards CCS. An 
additional potential threat may be a change in government perspective from long-term to short-
term, as this would likely result in government investments towards projects that provide short-
term returns, in contrast to CCS projects. Still, the fundamental political support remains strong. 
Similarly, governmental change in other countries may also affect the development of CCS which 
may impact Norwegian iron and steel both negatively and positively.  
 
With regard to regulatory stability, CCS development may be hindered due to existing regulations. 
An example of this was the London Protocol which initially held regulatory obstacles that 
restricted transboundary transportation of CO2, making it impossible for countries to trade CO2 
with countries where CO2 storage was possible. The London Protocol has now been modified to 
allow for international trade of CO2, as long as the purpose of the trade is for geological storage 
(Global CCS Institute, 2020). This will act as a lesser barrier for countries without full-scale CCS 
infrastructure to capture CO2, and acts as an advantage for the Norwegian Northern Lights project 
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which can now accept international CO2. Similar regulatory obstacles may delay development 
within CCS as regulatory change may take time and meet resistance by contract members.    
 
5.3.7. Summary of Political Analysis 
 
Clear commitment through regulations and frameworks 
Currently, Norway has clear policies and frameworks that signal involvement within CCS on a 
general level. There is a lack of frameworks that are formulated specifically for the iron and steel 
industry. This acts as a barrier as clear frameworks are needed in order to improve CCS 
involvement. Also, many political incentives have resulted in research and demonstration projects, 
but few political incentives have resulted in actual implementation or commercial development. 
 
Government involvement and the Longship Project 
The Government’s current dedication of resources towards Longship and other initiatives to meet 
NDC’s and Paris Agreement goals may result in funding towards additional CCS projects, such as 
CCS development within iron and steel. However, the opposite effect may occur if resources are 
solely dedicated towards Longship, excluding other industries. Yet, the Longship project provides 
other opportunities that the iron and steel sector may adapt such as international cooperation, CCS 
networks and hubs, knowledge transfer, reduced risks and costs, and CO2 storage opportunities. 
The expected synergy effects from Longship are numerous. With infrastructure in place and as 
costs decrease, the economic incentives of private investments in CCS will likely increase. This 
will invite more players onto the market, thereby creating a more commercially feasible 
environment for CCS. Risk and liability in connection to CCS projects will likely decrease if 
Longship proves its success.  
 
Government involvement in CCS projects creates positive associations with CCS and shows true 
dedication towards CCS as a solution to solve climate change. Additionally, knowledge and useful 
data is developed, providing obvious opportunities. However, Longship focuses primarily on the 
most feasible industries within CCS. This will result in further cost reductions with regard to CCS 
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within those specific industries. This is a barrier for iron and steel as iron and steel facilities lack 
readily available technology that can be adapted easily and at low costs.  
 
Fiscal policy 
Although the EU ETS has the goal of being an investment driver for CCS, the introduction of a 
higher carbon tax, in combination with EU ETS may decrease global competitiveness within iron 
and steel as long as CCS infrastructure or readily available technology is missing.  
 
Political and regulatory stability 
Political and regulatory stability will act as opportunities, whereas political and regulatory 
instability may act as barriers for iron and steel within CCS. Norwegian iron and steel has the 




This section analyses the identified social macroeconomic forces that are assumed to impact CCS 
within the Norwegian the iron and steel sector. First, the willingness to pay for CCS and drivers 
for social acceptance. Then, focus is dedicated towards Norway’s educational level and CCS 
knowledge hubs.  
 
5.4.1. Willingness to Pay for CCS 
 
Facilities will experience significantly high costs in the scenario of installing CCS equipment. This 
increase will ultimately result in an increase in product prices for the end consumers. The degree 
to which consumers are willing to pay for this increase will depend on factors such as the 
consumer’s reservation price, income effect and substitution effect (Hanemann, 1991). Studies 
conducted on the end user’s willingness to pay for higher electricity prices due to CCS 
implementation revealed that there are groups of consumers who show altruistic support towards 
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CCS regardless of higher prices (Tcvetkov, Cherepovitsyn, & Fedoseev, 2019). The threat for CCS 
deployment lies with the consumers of iron and steel who are not willing to pay for the additional 
resources required for carbon-free metal production. 
 
The capital-intensive nature of CCS projects heavily relies on funding. During demonstration 
projects or initial phases of CCS instalments, government funding is essential (Tcvetkov, 
Cherepovitsyn, & Fedoseev, 2019). In the long-term, as demonstration projects mature and 
technological feasibility improves, willingness to pay amongst institutional and private investors 
is expected to increase and eventually become the leading source of funding for CCS (Global CCS 
Institute, 2020). For such a reality, the economic feasibility of CCS must be proven to exist. As 
such, thriving capital markets may also act as an opportunity for CCS development in that sense 
private and public investments are made in the long-term to show evidence of support.  
 
Willingness to pay largely correlates with the willingness to accept (Hanemann, 1991). The social 
acceptance related to CCS is therefore studied in the following section.  
 
5.4.2. Social Acceptance   
 
CCS and Environmental Awareness  
 
For successful large-scale technological deployment, such as CCS, wide social acceptance is 
required (Gough & Mander, 2019). Studies by Pietzner et al., (2011) and Whitmarsh et al., (2019) 
show that Norway’s public awareness of CCS is high compared to other European countries. This 
is largely due to Norway’s involvement with CCS throughout the decades and generally high 
environmental awareness. Yet, the same study found that almost 40% of the Norwegian population 
(survey data collected between 2009-2010) did not recognise the topic of CCS. This shows that 
there is an opportunity to educate the population on CCS, as the lack of awareness may result in 
opposition for extensive CCS projects. 
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There is a lack of updated literature on the social perception of CCS in Norway. However, the 
Government’s involvement in the Longship project and other environmental commitments have 
resulted in reoccurring media exposure on the topic of CCS in major national media houses. This 
makes it possible to assume that Norway’s public awareness has increased since 2009/10. This 
awareness is likely accompanied with positive CCS associations as the Norwegian Government 
has displayed public support towards CCS as a realistic and efficient method towards climate 
mitigation goals, as is made evident in section 5.3. Politics (Tcvetkov, Cherepovitsyn, & Fedoseev, 
2019). If, however, new studies showing that public opinion of CCS is negative, this may hinder 
investment decisions and slow down the development of CCS within Norwegian industries and 
the iron and steel sector. 
 
An opportunity for CCS within Norwegian iron and steel is the current level of environmental 
awareness in Norway. The high level of environmental awareness results in environmental action 
being taken at governmental, corporate and municipal level. The strong evidence of CCS as a cost-
effective solution (Bui, et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2020) therefore acts as an opportunity towards CCS development. However, barriers also arise, as 
critics of CCS often argue that resources allocated towards CCS result in a lack of resources 
towards other climate change mitigation solutions, such as renewable energy and carbon-free 
industrial processes (Greenpeace, 2015; Pihkola, et al., 2017). Likewise, some communities have 
contradictory beliefs towards the science of global warming and may believe climate mitigation 




Researchers state that positive public opinion is important for CCS development because 
government and business decision-making will, to some degree, be influenced by public opinion 
(Bui, et al., 2018). Public opinion of CCS is therefore crucial for the future success of Norwegian 
CCS within iron and steel.  
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Recent studies show that support for CCS implementation in Norway, on a local and national level, 
receives high support amongst the Norwegian population (Whitmarsh, Xenias, & Jones, 2019). 
This positive public opinion may therefore influence further government policy related to CCS, 
and will unlikely result in drastic changes in government initiatives towards CCS in the case of 
electing a new government constellation. Likewise, iron and steel facilities do not need to fear that 
large investments in CCS will result in strong opposition from stakeholders. However, if public 
opinion is dramatically altered, governments and facilities may face challenges related to CCS 
investments. This shows that opportunities are created when public opinion is positive, whereas 
barriers are created when public opinion is negative.  
 
Negative public CCS perceptions may derive from being influenced by sources perceived as 
trustworthy. Social acceptance of CCS therefore also depends on corporate and governmental 
opinion. For example, Greenpeace is a perceivably trustworthy environmental non-governmental 
organisation that believes CCS is a diversion rather than a long-term solution. Greenpeace (2015) 
argues that the main goal of CCS is to alleviate environmental pressures off heavily polluting 
facilities, resulting in further continuation of oil extraction and extending the dependence of fossil 
fuels. This is also the case for certain nations, such as Germany and the Netherlands, whose 
governments have repeatedly criticised CCS due to high risks and storage challenges, which has 
resulted in low public support for CCS (Tcvetkov, Cherepovitsyn, & Fedoseev, 2019; Whitmarsh, 
Xenias, & Jones, 2019). As such, organisations and governments that actively criticise CCS will 
lead to lower social acceptance (Tcvetkov, Cherepovitsyn, & Fedoseev, 2019). 
 
Safety and Risk 
 
Social acceptance of CCS may be reinforced though strengthened safety and risk assessments, 
communicated clearly and effectively to the public. Literature reviewed by Tcvetkov et al. (2019), 
reveal that there are mixed perceptions of how safe CCS solutions are, especially related to CO2 
storage and geological CO2 leakage. Likewise, Whitmarsh et al. (2019) state that public acceptance 
of CCS is influenced by the unknown long-term safety concerns. As such, the safety concerns 
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associated with CCS solutions may act as a barrier (Pihkola, et al., 2017). Low social acceptance 
towards CCS may also be due to previously failed attempts with CCS in Norway, such as Jens 
Stoltenberg’s moon landing, as well as generally little understanding or education of the CCS 
technology. 
 




Pietzner et al.’s (2011) study revealed that survey respondents with a higher educational 
background showed a higher level of CCS awareness, signifying that education is an important 
driver under the social factor. 
 
The general educational level within Norway is amongst the highest in the world. Taking 
advantage of this is a clear opportunity for Norwegian iron and steel in order to be pioneers of new 
CCS solutions to reduce costs and increase capture efficiency. For example, the iron and steel 
sector can initiate collaborations with educational institutes in order to develop interest and 
expertise at an earlier stage of education. Likewise, developing university-level courses on CCS 
may result in a more specialised future workforce. This is needed to meet the expected demand 
from future CCS projects within Norway. This also applies to curricula beyond the engineering 
and geological aspects of CCS, such as social studies and economics, as this is currently acting as 





It is important to communicate the positive ripple effects that may adhere from CCS deployment, 
such as an increase in jobs. Reports published by SINTEF (2018) have estimated that full-scale 
infrastructure investments within CCS will create jobs both during and after construction, which 
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benefits Norway’s workforce. Yet, there are concerns that employment will mainly come from 
other countries (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020).    
 
5.4.4. CCS Ecosystems  
 
Clusters and Hubs 
 
As CCS ecosystems emerge, there will be an increased demand for knowledge and resource 
sharing. The development of CCS clusters and hubs can become a huge opportunity for the 
relatively small Norwegian iron and steel sector. CCS clusters are beneficial for risk and cost 
reductions by sharing investments in infrastructure and transport of carbon (Global CCS Institute, 
2020). As discussed in section 5.2.1. Cost Components of CCS, the geographical location of iron 
and steel facilities in Norway are closely located to sea transportation methods, which means that 




Although utilisation of economies of scale through clusters will significantly reduce risk and the 
unit cost of CO2 storage and transport, specific infrastructure for iron and steel may result in 
challenges (Zapantis, Townsend, & Rassool, 2019). For example, if CO2 storage facilities or CO2 
transport operators become inoperative, a high dependency on single distributers of such services 
may therefore be a barrier. 
 
5.4.5. Summary of Social Analysis 
 
Awareness and trust 
As the general population becomes more educated on environmental issues and the topic of CCS 
becomes more widespread, the willingness to pay and social acceptance towards CCS solutions 
can have several positive synergies. One example is through an increase in private investments 
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towards CCS related companies which will create a more stable market and further growth 
opportunities for CCS. Currently, the Norwegian population has a very positive attitude towards 
CCS, and environmental conscious solutions in general, which strengthens the opportunity for 
further CCS implementation. The problem lies in the trust towards CCS to be a reliable or even 
possible solution for climate change due to previously failed attempts with CCS. 
 
Education and employment  
Other issues arise when the public lacks knowledge and education. This is a long-term issue which 
effectively will negatively impact the development and deployment of CCS technology if there is 
no focus on CCS within education or in established polluting corporations. Education is needed to 
provide better public understanding and future interest in CCS. Simultaneously, the 
implementation of CCS should be viewed as a means of job creation in contrast to job destruction.    
 
Clusters and hubs 
Cooperation between polluting sectors and developers of CCS technology can create important 
expansion opportunities for CCS through amalgamation of infrastructure and knowledge sharing. 
This is especially true for iron and steel, as collaborations will strengthen their competitiveness on 




This section studies the environmental risks associated with CCS and the risks that may arise if 
CCS fails to be implemented. These environmental drivers emphasize the significant uncertainties 
connected to CCS. 
 
5.5.1. Environmental Risks with CCS 
 
An environmental risk largely discussed by critics of CCS (see also section 5.4.2. Social 
Acceptance) is related to the potential risk of geological CO2 leakage. Although the risk of leakage 
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from a storage site is extremely small, it is not non-existent (Global CCS Institute, 2020). To assess 
the total risk, it is useful to study the consequences of leakage and the probability of leakage 
occurring.   
 
In the event that carbon leaks from an offshore storage site through, for example, fractures in the 
rock formation, CO2 can migrate laterally or up towards the surface of the water. Depending on 
the rate of CO2 leakage, it can then either dissolve into the water, or reach the ocean surface (IPCC, 
2005). If the CO2 dissolves into the water, it can be corrosive to the ocean floor and harmful to 
marine ecosystems. If larger amounts of CO2 reach the surface layer and surrounding atmosphere, 
it can be dangerous to offshore platform workers, as well as other humans, animals and nature. 
Although CO2 is a natural component of air, it is hazardous in excessive amounts. Therefore, an 
episodic and localised leakage (for example due to an earthquake), will have more of an impact 
per unit CO2 released than minor continuous seepage from different points (IPCC, 2005).  
 
When it comes to the probability of leakage, IPCC (2005) find that more than 99% of the CO2 
stored is expected to be retained for the first 1000 years. However, Greenpeace (2008) argue that 
these numbers only apply for storage location that are properly selected, designed and managed. 
Nevertheless, the IPCC (2005) implies that although the consequences of a potential leak can be 
severe, the probability of this occurring is small enough to be considered safe. In Norway, safe 
storage has been demonstrated beneath the seabed on the Norwegian continental shelf since as 
early as 1996 (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). The continental shelf is 
extensively explored, and reservoir simulations and monitoring programmes have been utilised to 
check that storing CO2 is safe (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020).   
 
Another closely related environmental risk associated with the CCS storage component, relates to 
routine operation of the facility and injection well maintenance (IPCC, 2005). As CCS is still a 
relatively novel technology, countries have limited knowledge of managing CO2 injection for the 
explicit purpose of reducing GHG (IPCC, 2005). However, as mentioned, Norway already has 
operational CO2 storage facilities (Sleipner and Snøhvit), and is committed to further development 
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though Northern Lights (Global CCS Institute, 2020). Norway also has relevant knowledge and 
experience from closely related operations in oil and gas industries (Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2020), and is considered one of few countries to have sufficient geological 
resources for storage and full-scale CCS deployment (Consoli, 2018). Such a foundation can be 
an argument for why Norway is well positioned to handle operation and maintenance of new 
storage facilities.  
 
Finally, a third environmental risk is associated with the argument that CCS prolongs the fossil 
fuel industry, and the consequences of this. With increased governmental support and focus 
directed towards CCS, less economic resources and political attentional are being invested in 
renewables (Emily Rochon, et al., 2008). Although Norway produces almost all its electricity using 
renewable energy, petroleum-based research still receives almost five times more funding than 
renewable energy research (Emily Rochon, et al., 2008). Furthermore, in the eyes of funding, CCS 
is considered a part of renewable energy research (Emily Rochon, et al., 2008). However, 
according to Prosess21 (2021), renewables alone are unable to realise climate change mitigation 
or reverse the current course.  
 
5.5.2. Environmental Risks without CCS 
 
Without CCS technology, global warming will continue to impact natural and human ecosystems, 
both directly and indirectly (IPCC, 2018). In addition, global energy demand is expected to grow 
as a result of increasing populations and quality of living (Norsk Industri, 2016). Shell (2013) 
believe that renewables can account for up to only 40% of the global energy demand by 2060. This 
highlights the need for fossil fuels to sustain increased demand, but with a reduced carbon 
footprint. Furthermore, the production and maintenance of renewables in themselves are reliant on 
fossil fuels (Prosess21, 2021). Finally, the Global CCS Institute (2020) support a combined 
approach by saying that a renewables-only approach will disrupt the production of vital fossil fuel 
goods, such as medicine.  
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In addition to an increased demand for energy on a national and global scale, Norsk Industri (2016) 
predict an increase in the demand for low-carbon process industry products. This means that value 
must be created at the same time as emissions are reduced. If this is not possible through 
technologies such as CCS, the alternative is that industrial plants will need to be shut down. This 
risks carbon leakage through moved production, thereby increasing overall global carbon 
emissions (Norsk Industri, 2016). The Norwegian process industry is unique in that it is highly 
energy efficient, and well positioned to meet demands in a low-emission society with CCS (Norsk 
Industri, 2016).  
 
5.5.3. Summary of Environmental Analysis 
 
Continued use of fossil fuels 
Although associated with critique, an opportunity with CCS is that it allows for the continued use 
of fossil fuels, but with a dampened effect on the environment. This is important when a predicted 
increase in energy demand and population, is combined with the goal of maintaining value creation 
in a low-emission society.  
 
Pre-existing experience 
Furthermore, Norway’s well-explored continental shelf, former experience with CO2 storage and 
industrial knowledge from the petroleum industry, makes Norway well-equipped to handle the 
operation and maintenance of new storage facilities. It is also reasonable to assume that this 
provides valuable insight when assessing and selecting new geological locations for ocean storage. 
 
Risk of leakage 
A significant barrier to CCS is the potential risk of leakage. Since the probability of this is very 
small, storage is considered safe for the purpose of this thesis. Norway’s aforementioned 
experience is a factor that hopefully decreases this probability even further. Another interesting 
question is who should be liable for the cost of leakage, should such an event occur. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 5.6. Legal. 




A final drawback of CCS is that less investment can be directed to other climate solutions such as 
renewable energy. This thesis does not focus too heavily on the advantages and disadvantages of 
CCS compared to other emission-mitigating solutions, as there are several. However, there is 
consensus in that CCS is a necessary next step, and the environmental benefits of CCS seem to 




This section will take a closer look at the CCS-specific legislative and regulatory frameworks in 
Norway today. If weak legal frameworks surround CCS, it can lead to uncertainty about 
government commitment and reduce the urgency for facilities to implement the technology. 
 
The Global CCS Institute (2018) developed an indicator to compare and assess the status of 
national legal and regulatory regimes for CCS. A global overview of the results can be seen below. 
At the time of this assessment, Norway scored in Band B with a total CCS Legal and Regulatory 










Figure 13: Legal and Regulatory Indicator - Global Rank Map. Source: (Havercroft, 2018) 
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Although no country-specific conclusions were drawn, the report states that despite continued 
development of demonstration and commercial-scale projects, limited progress had been made in 
terms of legislative activity for the technology (Havercroft, 2018). To understand the extent this 
applies to Norway, an overview of the CCS-specific frameworks will follow. 
 
 CCS Directive 
 
A central legislative framework that Norway is subject to is the 2009 EU CO2 Storage Directive, 
also known as the CCS Directive. This focuses on the storage component of CCS, and specifies 
extensive requirements that must be met before accepting a storage site. This Directive dictates 
that no geological storage is possible without a storage permit to confirm that prior analysis has 
been made into the risk of leakage and damage to human health and the environment (European 
Commission, n.d.). The Directive covers additional aspects such as closure and post-closure 
obligations (e.g., monitoring), demands financial security from the operator to prove that adequate 
funding exists to cover the cost of obligations arising under the permit, and makes sure that third-
parties (potential users) gain access to storage sites and transport networks (DIRECTIVE 
2009/31/EC, 2009). In addition, it suggests that a transfer of responsibility from the operator to a 
competent authority can occur after a minimum period of 20 years, given that certain criteria is 
met (DIRECTIVE 2009/31/EC, 2009). To ensure permanent closure, a financial contribution is 
also required from the operator to the competent authority before this transfer can take place, to 




Responsibility for upholding different parts of the CCS Directive in Norway is delegated to the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoL), and 
the Ministry of Climate and Environment (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2020). 
The MPE is given authority over exploration and exploitation of subsea geological formations with 
respect to transport and storage, and the use of these formations for CO2 storage (Henriksen & 
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Besche, 2012). Those considering conducting storage activities must apply for surveying, 
exploration and exploitation licences from the MPE (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2017). The MoL regulates safety issues related to transport and storage of CO2 to the 
subsea geological formations on the continental shelf (Henriksen & Besche, 2012). In February 
2020, the Petroleum Safety Authority (under the MoL), issued new regulations regarding CO2 
safety, including general requirements for material and information, the use of recognised 
standards, design and use of facilities, documentation and reporting, and the need for consent for 
certain activities (Petroleum Safety Authority, 2020). Finally, the Ministry of Climate and 
Environment handles environmental issues, and jointly addresses the financial guarantees 
submitted by the potential operator together with the MPE (Agerup, n.d.).  
 
If a licensee chooses to develop a subsea reservoir into a location for injection and storage of CO2, 
copies of a development and operation plan, impact assessment, and safety and work environment 
plan shall be submitted to all three ministries (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2017). Finally, consent for injection and storage of CO2 is given by the MPE and MoL (Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017). Transfer of responsibility from the operator to the MPE 
can occur after a minimum of 20 years, unless the MPE is convinced that the stored CO₂ will 
remain permanently enclosed before this time (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2017). A financial contribution shall also be made by the operator to the state, as stated by the CCS 
Directive, which should be large enough to cover 30 years’ worth of anticipated monitoring 
expenses (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017).  
 
In terms of liability of pollution damage caused by discharges or CO2 emissions from the storage 
site, regulation states that the licensee is liable regardless of guilt. The responsibility can only be 
reduced if the damage is caused by unavoidable circumstances (e.g., natural occurrence or act of 
war) (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017). The MPE also requires that licensees 
ensure reasonable insurance coverage for all activities conducted in accordance with the 
regulations (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2017).  
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Overall, although these three ministries together make up a regulatory framework for transport and 
storage of CO2, Norway does not have a streamlined CCS framework. Instead, it considers the 
development and deployment of CCS on a case-to-case basis (Baker & McKenzie, 2009). It is also 
understood that various CCS activities will be subject to general Norwegian laws, but the extent 
of this depends on case-specific circumstances (Henriksen & Besche, 2012). This can result in 
confusion for the case facilities, in that sense there are no clear guidelines of which general laws 
would be applicable.  
 
5.6.1. Summary of Legal Analysis 
 
Research suggests that the legislative and regulatory status for CCS in Norway is somewhat 
limited. This can confirm the findings given by the Global CCS Institute (2018). It appears that 
the majority of regulations in place today are mainly directed towards CO2 storage, with less focus 
on the capture and transport components. In addition, it is assumed that CCS will fall under general 
Norwegian laws, but which laws that apply to CCS and to what degree can be considered confusing 
for facilities considering implementation. Since the deployment of CCS is currently considered on 
a case-to-case basis, making specific CCS laws could signal greater commitment and promise. The 
main concern of many is also the aspect of liability. With a high degree of liability, less incentive 
exists to establish new storage sites, which in turn affects CO2 storage capacity, and potential cross-
risk in the entire CCS chain (see section 5.4.4. CCS Ecosystems). Risk sharing laws of CO2 storage 
liability could potentially alleviate this problem. 
 
5.7. END OF CHAPTER 5 
 
This concludes the PESTEL macroenvironmental analysis of CCS within the Norwegian iron and 
steel sector. Based on these findings, Chapter 6 proceeds by analysing governmental policies that 
can aid CCS development. All findings from Chapters 5 and 6 are then evaluated and concluded 
in Chapter 7.
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6. Analysis of Government Policies 
On the basis of the macroenvironmental analysis presented above, the following chapter will 
analyse potential environmental policies that may encourage development and deployment of CCS 
in the Norwegian iron and steel sector. This is done to discuss the second research question.  
 
This chapter assumes CCS to be an essential technology for reducing emissions from Norwegian 
production. In order to explore to what extent policies must be implemented, this analysis will be 
grounded in the environmental policies described in section 3.3. Environmental Policies.   
 




Liability laws make a facility liable for environmental damages caused. Liability laws can be 
further divided into strict liability and negligence.  
 
Liability laws and compensation payment from the individual facilities can work in the same way 
as an emission tax. Liability laws can also be placed on operators of CO2 storage to increase the 
availability of infrastructure. According to the IEA (2013), governments cannot focus on CO2 
capture without also giving equal attention to CO2 storage. This is because for the iron and steel 
sector to adopt CCS, they must know that a commercial model exists for CO2 transport and storage.  
 
Liability laws can be used to reduce the concerns associated with who is financially liable for 
leakage during transport and storage. Today, the regulations regarding liability for pollution 
damage are strict. Forming a clear differentiation between strict liability and negligence may help 
ease this concern. This would create a form of risk-sharing system between the operator and 
government. When monitoring is difficult, this policy ensures that operators take appropriate steps 
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to prevent storage leakage, while at the same time the operators are not punished beyond what is 
reasonable.  
 
A challenge with liability laws is that it can be difficult to measure damage and fault, thereby also 
making it difficult to assign blame and determine the exact amount of compensation required from 
each party. This implies that although more lenient liability laws could lead to more operators 
supplying transport and storage infrastructure, it may be difficult to achieve in practice due to 




Voluntary action encourages facilities to engage in pollution control without any formal 
regulations. Two social forces that can lead to voluntary action are moral suasion and informal 
community pressure.  
 
To appeal to a facility’s sense of morals, the Government needs to clearly define the benefits of 
utilising CCS to reduce emissions. Establishing a simple, stable and well-functioning market or 
networking platform for CCS components would also make it simpler for facilities (potential users) 
and suppliers (operators) to connect. This would lower the hurdles linked to voluntary action. A 
risk of this approach is, however, ‘moral free-riding’, where less morally sensitive facilities enjoy 
the benefits of other’s commitment to carbon capture. 
 
Using informal community pressure is perhaps an even more effective tool than moral suasion. 
Norway has a good foundation for using this decentralised policy approach, as the Norwegian 
population is already environmentally conscious (see section 5.4.2. Social Acceptance). By making 
facilities’ emission data more easily and readily available for the general public, public awareness 
and interest can be increased, further pressuring CCS employment. This way, facilities may feel 
more conscious of own emissions, and voluntarily enforce steps to abate for the sake of 
maintaining their reputation. Information is thus a powerful tool in this scenario.   







An emission standard command-and-control policy requires facilities to limit themselves to a fixed 
level or quantity of emissions. To make sure the standard is being met by each of the case facilities, 
the Government could use inspections, monitoring, sanctions, fines or other penalties. By setting 
an emission standard, the Government could ensure that the climate goals will be met. It is also a 
way of demanding removal, versus continuing to allow facilities to emit and simply pay for extra 
carbon credits.  
 
There are also disadvantages with using this method to incentivise use of CCS. First, the 
Government has no control over what abatement techniques are being used. Second, this method 
would force facilities to reduce their emissions to a given limit, without incentivising abatement 
beyond this. It is also difficult to know where to set this limit, and whether this limit should be the 
same for each of the case facilities. If the limit is set too low (i.e., the policy is too strict), this could 
increase the risk of carbon leakage. Finally, this policy approach is dependent on a high degree of 
monitoring, which would have to be conducted by different regional authorities, since the case 
facilities are spread across the country. This could potentially lead to unsatisfactory monitoring in 




Another command-and-control policy is technology standards. Here, the Government could 
simply demand that facilities install CCS within a certain timeframe. Benefits of this approach 
include that it ensures quick adoption, and that it would apply uniformly across all of the iron and 
steel facilities. Apart from the time and resources that would have to go to enforcement and 
inspection, this approach would require less resources from the Government in terms of monetary 
aid and other situation-specific policies.   
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A drawback of a universal technology standard is, however, that it could be politically unpopular. 
This is because it does not take into account differences in emission levels, and would treat all 
facilities the same. A facility emitting less than other facilities may consider this unfair. Another 
serious drawback is that this approach would eliminate any incentive for further R&D. If facilities 
were required to use today’s CCS technology, there would be no reward for finding superior 
approaches or improving the existing technology. CCS development would halt, and as would the 
economic, technological and environmental benefits innovation would bring.   
 
6.1.3. Incentive-Based Policies 
 
Emission Charges (Taxes) 
 
Emission taxes are a policy that would require the case facilities to pay a certain charge for every 
unit of emission released. As discussed in section 5.3.3. Fiscal Policy, Norway has been using 
carbon taxes since 1991. It was also found that extensive tax exemptions are given to the process 
industry, which means that the tax has only contributed to modest reductions. Increasing this tax 
and making it applicable to all sectors can give facilities increased economic incentive to avoid 
CO2 emissions.  
 
The Norwegian Government intends to increase the carbon tax by 2030, which is positive for 
reducing emissions. In addition to motivating facilities to cut emissions, this would generate 
government revenue that could in turn be used to further stimulate CCS development. In contrast 
to a technology standard which hinders R&D, facilities would now have an incentive to continue 
researching for better and more cost-effective ways to improve capture technology. This is because 
a facility’s R&D efforts would lead to a greater reduction in their total pollution control-related 
costs (abatement cost + tax payments) (Field & Field, 2017). Whether this policy directly results 
in increased use of CCS solutions within the case facilities is less certain. CC technology in 
Norway is also produced by external suppliers and not the iron and steel facilities themselves, 
which makes this push-for-innovation argument less applicable for the iron and steel sector.  
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Similar to the command-and-control standards, a relevant question is at what rate to set the 
emission tax. If the rate is too low, it is possible that facilities will not consider it worthwhile to 
conduct R&D, locate and install CCS, or operate and maintain the technology, as opposed to 
simply paying for carbon credits. If the rate is too high, the Government could risk losing voters 
over a politically unpopular decision, or risk carbon leakage. This policy also involves a response 
delay, as facilities need time to respond to the tax rate before the Government knows whether the 




Instead of forceful policies for CCS investments through direct regulations in terms of emissions 
quantities and use of technology, or higher CO2 prices through taxation, the Norwegian 
Government can also attempt to pull CCS investments through subsidisation. Subsidisation can 
take several forms. For example, it can be given directly to iron and steel facilities when installing 
CC technology, to producers of CC technology, to suppliers of transport and storage, or to R&D 
institutes. Subsidisation can include paying facilities per unit of emissions reduced, capital grants, 
tax exemptions or cost-sharing plans.  
 
Facilities may be motivated to install CCS if awarded with financial returns for every unit (e.g., 
tonne) of emissions reduced. An example is the 45Q tax credit in the US discussed in section 5.3.4. 
International Government Policy. While this approach has the potential of giving the desired effect 
and has resulted in CCS installations in the US, the Government has little influence over what 
abatement techniques are used by polluting facilities. In addition, it can risk leading to perverse 
incentives. That is, if facilities know that profits can be made by capturing more CO2, it gives 
financial incentives to produce more CO2.  
 
Financial support in the form of capital grants or tax exemptions can alternatively be given to 
facilities for the procurement and installation of CC technology. This would help bridge the gap 
between the price of CO2 and the MAC curve (see section Figure 11 under 5.2.4. Socioeconomic 
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Emission Level) during the ramp up stage. The IEA (2013) argue that government focus should be 
on demonstration and early development, and this approach encourages first-of-a-kind projects. 
Once the MAC curve falls by natural means (such as technological development or more users), 
financial aid can be reduced. 
 
Bridging the gap between the price of CO2 and the MAC curve can also be done by providing 
grants or tax exemptions to CC suppliers. This way, the technology can be sold to polluting 
facilities at a lower cost. This approach would be less specific to the iron and steel sector, but 
would allow for cheaper installation across all industries. It would, nevertheless, benefit the iron 
and steel sector, in that it could improve knowledge-sharing, infrastructure-related insights and 
allow for transport sharing between clusters.   
 
Next, by creating cost-sharing plans with potential operators of transport and storage, it could help 
mitigate the financial risk related to potential underutilisation during the ramp up years (see section 
5.2.1. Cost Components of CCS). It is possible that more actors of transport and storage will enter 
the market if it is believed it is possible to hedge oneself against less demand during the first years, 
and reap the benefits of increased demand in the near future. If this approach is used in combination 
with the negligence liability law discussed earlier, operators are spared much of the financial risk 
connected to both underutilisation and potential leakage. If the Government increases the 
availability of infrastructure by encouraging more suppliers of transport and storage, this reduces 
cross-chain interdependency risk for the iron and steel case facilities (see section 5.4.4. CCS 
Ecosystems).  
 
Finally, subsidisation can also be given to R&D institutes. This would help accelerate the 
development of technology, possibly bringing down the MAC curve at a faster pace. This could 
also help increase the possibilities for retrofitting, which is a necessary requirement for the iron 
and steel case facilities.  
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A major drawback of subsidisation as an environmental policy is that it involves a trade-off. Critics 
of CCS, such as Greenpeace (2008), highlighted this by stating that investments towards CCS is 
resources lost on renewables. Subsidisation requires resources from the national budget, which 
implies that less government revenue is available to spend on other aspects of society. This may 
include investment in renewables, but also education, infrastructure, health systems, and more. 
Another potential risk arises when actors believe there is an opportunity for financial gain from 
subsidies upon entering the iron and steel sector. If more actors enter the market, total emissions 
will increase, rather than decrease, leading to inefficiencies in the market.  
 
Market-Based Trading Systems 
 
The EU ETS is an example of a cap-and-trade market-based trading system, which Norway is 
subject to. This has proven to be an effective policy in allocating emissions to polluters who have 
high costs associated with abatement. As the Market Stability Reserve now removes excess supply 
of allowances, the future carbon price should be less volatile. An advantage of this policy is that a 
centralised agency can decide the annual rate at which the quantity of allowances is reduced. This 
is currently being increased from 1.7% to 2.2%. While this policy reduces the risk of carbon 
leakage as polluters are given time to adjust to fewer allowances, it is slow at showing results. 
Critics therefore fear that this policy is not sufficient on its own to meet the climate goals, which 
acts as a major disadvantage. Likewise, this policy may decrease Norwegian iron and steel’s global 
competitiveness as CCS retrofitting and CCS infrastructure-technology is not currently in place. 
 
6.1.4. Additional Policies 
 
The policies above are largely aimed at accelerating short-run changes in CCS utilisation. One 
important aspect brought up in section 5.4.3. Human Capital was the role of education. While 
short-run development should be prioritised first, it is also important for the Government to invest 
in high-quality CCS-related education. This raises awareness amongst futures scholars, politicians 
and leaders, hopefully contributing to continued use of capture technology over time. CCS 
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engagement can also be created by, for example, inviting students to participate in projects at the 
Norwegian CCS Research Centre or Test Centre Mongstad.  
 
Finally, as government funding and commitment was also found to vary over the years in section 
5.3.3. Fiscal Policy, the Government could consider signing long-term agreements with the EU to 
avoid CCS-related setbacks in the case of a change in government constellation. 
 
6.2. END OF CHAPTER 6 
 
Chapter 6 has reviewed a range of environmental policies that the Government could employ to 








Previous chapters have analysed opportunities and barriers, and specific government policies 
applicable to the iron and steel sector. The findings are discussed and evaluated in this chapter. 
 
7.1. PESTEL RESULTS 
 
In terms of opportunities, there are clearly positive prospects in relation to the Government’s 
involvement in constructing full-scale CCS infrastructure. The case facilities can potentially be 
integrated to this CCS infrastructure due to their geographical locations. Through well-defined 
delegation of authorities and storage potential, this provides reduced risk, uncertainties and 
possible cost reductions for the case facilities. This is further supported through trustworthy and 
stable Norwegian political and corporate institutions, creating a leeway for developing CCS 
ecosystems though clusters and hubs. The fact that education and environmental awareness is 
robust increases the chances of amplified demand for low-emission goods, thus increasing the 
willingness to pay for environmental goods. Also, the ability to retrofit CCS technology in 
facilities contributes to reducing CCS barriers for energy-intensive and fuel-dependent industries. 
Investigations prove that it is technologically possible to retrofit CCS in existing case facilities. 
Moreover, Norwegian CCS research centres prove that nth-of-a-kind CCS technology will result 
in reduced costs and risk. Finally, the recent developments in increased carbon prices provides 
interesting prospects for future expansion possibilities for abatement technology, such as CCS.  
 
Despite obvious political commitment, a lack of sector-specific incentives and funding is apparent. 
A main barrier is the current insufficient value of carbon emissions by which the abatement cost 
of CO2 avoided exceeds the price of carbon. Economists have already concluded that setting a 
sufficient value on emissions is the most cost-effective method of emission reduction, suggesting 
that increasing the value on carbon would promote investments in CCS. Likewise, the profound 
complexity of customised CCS technology obstructs accurate cost estimations, as well as 




current implementation. Insufficient emphasis on the legal aspects concerning capture, transport 
and storage also increases cross-chain risks, as full-scale CCS needs to be fully functional for 
success. Subsequently, the barriers may prove so significant that the consequences outweigh the 
benefits, resulting in a justifiable trade-off from investments in CCS to alternative abatement 
technologies.  
 
To what extent these drivers reflect economic and political support for the implementation of CCS 
in Norwegian iron and steel is dependent on the pending obliteration of the most significant 
barriers, and especially how technical and cost prospects mature. The PESTEL framework does 
not indicate numerical weighing of each factor. With the current findings from the PESTEL results, 
the authors therefore assume that the opportunities compensate for the barriers in the case of 
implementing CCS. The main findings are also summarised in Figure 14. 
  




7.2. POLICY EVALUATION 
 
Which policies are best suited depend on what phase overall CCS progress is in. Today, a finite 
number of CCS projects are operational. For this reason, the Government is currently amid a CCS 
ramp up stage. Policies should therefore be focused on achieving more widespread development 
and deployment of CCS across industries, including iron and steel.  
 
Making the public aware of the importance of CCS is a huge first step in incentivising deployment. 
This is because it can trigger voluntary action, despite the fact that CCS is not presently cost-
competitive. Likewise, it can encourage small-scale private investments, leading to more stable 
financial markets for CCS solutions. Despite the costs that would go towards press releases, media 
coverage or other information channels, this approach requires almost no government resources. 
The aim is to use information as a tool to pressure facilities into using CCS. According to Field & 
Field (2017), policymakers often underestimate the effect of internet connectedness, social media, 
public morality and civic virtue. In addition, an environmental policy relying on voluntary action 
has the potential to create widespread spillover effects. That is, the more facilities that invest in 
CCS, the more the remaining facilities will feel pressured to do so as well. 
 
An issue that remains with voluntary action is first-mover disadvantage. First-of-a-kind projects 
are more costly due to the lack of experience and undeveloped technology. The Government 
therefore also needs to employ policies that make the technology more commercially viable. Here, 
subsidisation can be a useful instrument. To avoid perverse incentives linked to payment per unit 
CO2 reduced, subsidisation should be given in the form of capital grants or tax exceptions for CCS. 
This also defines which specific technology the subsidisation is for, providing the Government 
with some control over the abatement technologies being used. A drawback of this method, which 
needs to be considered, is that it extracts government revenue from other causes. However, it is 
possible to use subsidisation for a limited time to encourage use of CCS during the ramp up phase, 
until the MAC curve falls by natural means. This way, first-movers are rewarded, while second-




In addition to subsidising the installation and implementation of CCS for first-movers, the 
Government could provide capital grants to R&D institutions. This would hopefully contribute to 
accelerating technological developments and make retrofitting technology cheaper, which would 
bring the MAC curve down faster. Once the marginal cost of abatement equals the price of carbon, 
facilities will favour CCS. Subsidising CCS in this way also signals the Government’s support for 
the technology. If claims are made about the importance of CCS to the public in an attempt to 
stimulate voluntary action, it is important for the Government to show their commitment as well.  
 
With regard to carbon taxes already in place in Norway today, fewer exemptions should be given. 
If all sectors are to reduce their emissions, all sectors should be subject to emissions-sanctions. 
The Norwegian Government has already expressed intentions to increase the carbon taxes. While 
doing so, it is important that taxes are not set too high. The iron and steel sector has already 
decreased in size in Norway over the years, and the goal is not for the production for remaining 
facilities to be shut down or move. Furthermore, if carbon taxes are applied in combination with 
subsidisation, it is possible that investing in CCS becomes more appealing, as the facility’s total 
pollution control-related costs increases from pre-existing MAC to MAC plus the tax payment. 
This effect is amplified with continued increase in carbon prices in the EU ETS. 
 
As stated by the IEA (2013), “CCS deployment can only move as quickly as the slowest developing 
part of the CCS process.” This means that in order to accelerate deployment of CCS in the iron 
and steel sector, the Government also needs to turn its attention towards the transport and storage 
components. Here, well-defined liability laws that promote risk-sharing in unavoidable leakage 
cases can help encourage operators to take on the financial risk of supplying transport and storage. 
As it is difficult to assign blame in such technically complex cases, the Government would need 
to ensure that significant monitoring systems are implemented.  
 
Finally, command-and-control policies are effective in that the Government can simply demand 
the desired outcome. However, a major disadvantage is that facilities have no incentive to go 




difficulties arise in terms of where to set the standards, whether to set uniform standards and the 
economics of enforcement. Finally, setting emission or technology standards are forceful policies. 
For this reason, the next government constellation may want to appeal to voters by removing such 
unpopular regulations, which would be inefficient for environmental progress. This study therefore 
considers these policies as poor methods for encouraging use of CCS.  
 
Overall, it is clearly not possible to apply one policy in isolation and different policies should be 
used in combination to make CCS more attractive. Applying decentralised policies in combination 
with incentive-based policies, creates less risk and fewer economic challenges for facilities to 
employ CCS as first-movers. Utilisation of such policies, as opposed to stricter command-and-
control policies, also reduces the risk of carbon leakage. Today, government focus should be 
directed towards policies that help accelerate CCS development and deployment in the ramp up 
phase. This can justify increased government expenditure in the form of subsidisation, which can 
be reduced as CCS becomes more widespread. However, to facilitate future CCS engagement, the 
Government should expedite its commitment by investing in relevant education and by committing 







8. Conclusion  
This thesis has explored the following research questions in an attempt to evaluate CCS as a means 
for the iron and steel sector to reach the current environmental goals: 
  
To what extent does the economic and political environment support the implementation 
of CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel sector? 
  
To what extent are government policies necessary in order to accelerate the development and 
deployment of CCS in the Norwegian iron and steel sector?  
  
The thesis was formed as a pragmatic, exploratory case study. This entailed reviewing sufficient 
quantities of data to deliver conclusions that may impact future organisational and political 
practises. This provided central insights into the economic and political support environment for 
CCS implementation. Currently, economic conditions do not incentivise the instalment of CCS for 
the iron and steel sector. Yet, price prospects suggest that the value of CO2 may increase to better 
represent the damages caused by emissions. The political environment for CCS is generally strong, 
though attention on the iron and steel sector lacks. Thus, the political environment must be adjusted 
to effectively assist the implementation of CCS in the iron and steel sector. 
 
The thesis’ research reveals that financial funding and government support policies would greatly 
aid CCS progression. As such, decentralised and incentive-based policies should be implemented, 
by which a combination of policies are necessary to achieve the desired environmental goals. 
 
The degree to which these results reflect the true setting for CCS in the iron and steel sector depend 
on the assumptions set for this thesis and future progress. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that 
Norway has the potential to become a leading user of the technology. Therefore, the thesis 
concludes that there is significant value in the Norwegian Government aiding the acceleration of 
CCS development in all industry sectors, large and small.   
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9. Limitations and Future Research  
9.1. LIMITATIONS TO THIS STUDY 
 
When conducting this thesis, some simplifications and assumptions have been made that could act 
as limitations to the study.  
 
 Use of Industry Average Costs 
 
The industry average CO2 avoidance cost that was used as the basis for the total cost calculations 
and analysis in 5.2.2. CO2 Avoidance Cost and 5.2.3. Socioeconomic Emission Level, is likely 
lower than it would be in reality. This is because many of the case studies used to find the industry 
average assumed nth-of-a-kind facilities or mature technology. Some of the cost estimations were 
projections for future costs, and may therefore have assumed more rapid cost development than 
has actually occurred. If this is the case, a larger gap currently exists between the marginal 
abatement cost and the price of carbon. This would mean that more government support would be 
needed in terms of both R&D and widespread deployment. This could result in the CCS technology 
being less worthwhile than is estimated in this study, due to the increased opportunity costs created 
for the Government.  
 
In addition, the use of an industry average is a highly simplified method of calculating the CO2 
avoidance cost. This assumes that each facility is faced with the same costs, which is not 
representative. In reality, costs will be extremely case-specific, which is why so much uncertainty 
is already associated with the technology.  
 
 Evaluation of PESTEL Results 
 
The PESTEL framework does not provide measurements or numerical implications for evaluating 
the identified opportunities and barriers. As such, the theory does not indicate how to weigh an 
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opportunity against a barrier. Consequently, assumptions have been made about the importance of 
different drivers for the iron and steel sector. Researcher bias may lead to false impressions of the 
identified opportunities outweighing the identified threats. As such, the discussion of government 
policies could be based on false conclusions and assumptions about the market, without adequate 
quantitative data to inform where support should be directed.  
 
 Data Sources 
 
The thesis primarily uses secondary data. This is a limitation because the sources used can be either 
outdated or written specifically for other case studies. Supplementary primary data could add 
insight into emission quantities, specific cost components and the overall iron and steel sector. 
Increased participation from industry experts from iron and steel would allow for conducting more 
specific and accurate cost calculations, beyond what this thesis accomplished. This could have 
resulted in new or different findings and conclusions.  
 
9.1. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There are several areas where the findings of this study could be further developed. First, this thesis 
focuses solely on CCS as a solution for climate change mitigation. This was done intentionally to 
limit the scope of the study. However, it may be interesting to compare the economic feasibility 
and advantages of CCS relative to other technologies, such as additional renewable solutions, 
hydrogen, carbon capture with utilisation and storage (CCUS), bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) or direct air capture and sequestration (DACS). This might lead to different 
conclusions about where government policies and support should be directed, and how allocation 
of resources should be prioritised in the short-run.  
 
Additionally, in terms of the theory used, this thesis depicts a simple MAC curve to portray the 
problems faced by polluters. By studying all available abatement technology options for the entire 
process industry, a more technology-detailed MAC curve could be created. This may prove helpful 
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for the industry as a whole on the choice of abatement technology, and for policymakers as it 
provides more detailed information than a simplified MAC curve. 
 
Another area for future research would be to create a roadmap for policy implementation, 
highlighting a timeline for when different policies should be put into effect. This could more 
clearly guide large scale CCS deployment over time.  
 
Finally, as the CO2 avoidance cost estimates are currently based on a universal industry average 
cost/tCO2 rather than separate costs/tCO2 for each case facility, it would be interesting to conduct 
a sensitivity analysis to see how the overall costs could be expected to vary under different site- 
specific conditions. However, this would require extensive participation from the industry, as well 
as disclosure of sensitive corporate information. Complementary research could include surveying 
end users’ willingness to pay for carbon neutral iron and steel products. Such research would add 
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11.1. Appendix A 
















Hydro Aluminium, Høyanger Aluminum 104,000 70% 90% 
Sør-Norge Aluminium Aluminum 142,000 70% 90% 
Alcoa aluminium, Lista Aluminum 160,000 70% 90% 
Hydro Aluminium, Årdal Metallverk Aluminum 300,000 70% 90% 
Hydro Aluminium, Karmøy Aluminum 336,000 70% 90% 
Hydro Aluminium, Sunndal Aluminum 660,000 70% 90% 
Yara Norge, Yara Porsgrunn Chemical production 487,000 50% 90% 
Equinor ASA avd.Tjeldbergodden Metanolfabrikk Chemical production  312,000 NA NA 
NORETYL AS Chemical production  432,000 50% 70% 
Ferroglobe Mangan Norge AS Iron and steel 137,000 35% 80% 
ELKEM ASA AVD BJØLVEFOSSEN Iron and steel 174,000 35% 80% 
Eramet Norway AS, Porsgrunn Iron and steel 185,000 35% 80% 
Eramet Norway Kvinesdal Iron and steel 228,000 35% 80% 
TiZir Titanium & Iron AS Iron and steel 261,000 35% 80% 
Finnfjord Iron and steel 284,000 35% 80% 
Elkem Rana AS Iron and steel 298,000 35% 80% 
ERAMET NORWAY AS, Sauda Iron and steel 320,000 35% 80% 
Norcem Kjøpsvik Non-metallic minerals  401,000 70% 90% 
Norcem Brevik Non-metallic minerals  878,000 70% 90% 
NorFraKalk Non-metallic minerals  167,000 70% 90% 
Wacker Chemicals Norway Non-metallic minerals  274,000 NA NA 
Elkem Thamshavn Non-metallic minerals  277,000 NA NA 
Elkem Bremanger Non-metallic minerals  319,000 NA NA 
Elkem Salten Non-metallic minerals  476,000 NA NA 
Borregaard AS, avd. spesialcellulose Pulp and paper 166,000 70% 90% 
Norske Skog Saugbrugs Pulp and paper 178,000 70% 90% 
Norske Skog Skogn Pulp and paper 203,000 70% 90% 
Esso Norge, Slagentangen Refinery 330,000 45% 70% 




11.2. Appendix B 
Table B.1: Total Emissions per Process Industry Sector 
 






Process Industry Sector 




Fraction of Total 
Emissions 
Aluminum 1,702,000 1% 15.69% 
Chemical production (ammonia) 1,231,000 97-100% 11.35% 
Iron and steel 1,887,000 25% 17.39% 
Non-metallic minerals (cement) 2,792,000 20-25% 25.74% 
Pulp and paper 547,000  14% 5.04% 
Refinery 2,690,000  8% 24.79% 
Total emissions for process industry  10,849,000 - 1 









Type of Off-Gas 
(Kuramochi et al., 2011) 17% 25% Air-Blown Blast Furnace 
(Kuramochi et al., 2011) 35% NA Top Gas Recycling Blast Furnace 
(Kuramochi et al., 2011) 25% 35% Smelting reduction 
(Leeson et al., 2014) 35% NA Top Gas Recycling Blast Furnace 
(Endrava, 2021) 22% NA Basic iron and steel 
(Garðarsdóttir et al., 2018) 30% NA Power plant iron and steel 
(Garðarsdóttir et al., 2018) 20% 25% Other stacks 
(IPCC, 2005) 15% 16% Oxygen steel furnace 




11.3. Appendix C 
Table C.1: Government investments in CO2 management. Source: National Accounts 2014-2020; National Budget 2021, sections 
1840; 142074 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021* 
CO2 Management         
   Longship        236.0 2275.0 
   TCM 1720.9 1649.0 1587.5 515.6 193.0 199.6 180.0 165.0 
   R&D 200.0 199.8 239.6 199.2 182.1 186.5 160.0 164.0 
   Gassnova, Admin. 108.3 131.3 160.3 284.1 118.6 128.8 108.8 105.0 
   Other 19.6 133.9 53.5 25.1 162.2 375.5 108.0  
   Sum  2048.8 2114.0 2040.9 1024.0 655.9 890.4 792.8 2709.0 
          
CO2 Compensation for 
Industry 
222.7 402.5 497.9 636.4 469.2 544.0 1434.7 0 
          






2021* taken from National Budget 
